Michael Devereux
- Venue
-
Îlot Bernard du Bois
- Salle 15
AMU - AMSE
5-9 boulevard Maurice Bourdet
13001 Marseille - Date(s)
-
Friday, June 14 2024
12:30pm to 1:30pm - Contact(s)
-
Marco Fongoni: marco.fongoni[at]univ-amu.fr
Francesco Gaudio: francesco-saverio.gaudio[at]univ-amu.fr
Abstract
Foreign reserves management changes the risk profile of a currency, there- fore influencing the pricing of sovereign debt, and the sovereign debt cur- rency portfolio. Empirically, inflation-targeters in emerging countries with higher foreign reserves feature an “original sin” dissipation: high local cur- rency share in the sovereign debt portfolio. We propose a quantitative model of optimal reserves management and sovereign currency portfolios. The op- timal reserves policy leans against the global wind so the exchange rate de- preciates less in global bad times, resulting in a lower premium charged by global investors and more local currency sovereign debt. We confirm these features empirically and via data-simulated regressions.