Nicolas Gravel

Faculty ,  Aix-Marseille Université , Faculté d'économie et de gestion (FEG)

Public economics
Gravel
Status
Professor
Research domain(s)
Economic philosophy, Public economics, Social choice
Thesis
1993, University of British Columbia - Canada
Download
CV
Contact
nicolas.gravel[at]univ-amu.fr
Address

Maison de l'économie et de la gestion d'Aix
424 chemin du viaduc, CS80429
13097 Aix-en-Provence Cedex 2

Abstract http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0">The di¤erent options people select from a set of non-rival alternatives are compared in terms of singularity. A criterion for ranking these choices on the basis of the number of other choices from which they di¤er is introduced and characterized. An axiomatic characterization of the ranking of choice pro…les based on the aggregation of the singularities of the chosen alternatives is also provided. JEL Classi…cation : D63 Keywords : Diversity, Freedom of choice, Orderings, Choice pro…les. "The prosp ects of freedom in the contem p orary world m ay well lie in the recognition of the plurality of our identities, where p ersonal identity must b e understo o d as an extension of one's own choice of b eing som eone or doing som ething" (A. K. Sen (2006))
Publication HAL Google Scholar
Abstract The different options people select from a set of non-rival alternatives are compared in terms of singularity. A criterion for ranking these choices on the basis of the number of other choices from which they differ is introduced and characterized. An axiomatic characterization of the ranking of choice profiles based on the aggregation of the singularities of the chosen alternatives is also provided.
Keywords Freedom of choice, Orderings, Choice profiles
Publication HAL Google Scholar
Abstract We propose a framework for the analysis of choice behaviour when the latter is made explicitly in chronological order. We relate this framework to the traditional choice theoretic setting from which the chronological aspect is absent, and compare it to other frameworks that extend this traditional setting. Then, we use this framework to analyse various models of preference discovery. We characterise, via simple revealed preference tests, several models that differ in terms of (1) the priors that the decision-maker holds about alternatives and (2) whether the decision-maker chooses period by period or uses her knowledge about future menus to inform her present choices. These results provide novel testable implications for the preference discovery process of myopic and forward-looking agents.
Keywords Chronological choice, Preference discovery, Revealed preferences, Myopic agents, Forward-looking agents
Publication HAL Google Scholar
Abstract We compare distributions of Body Mass Index (BMI) categories among genders in France, the US and the UK on the basis of effciency and inequality considerations. The new normative criteria that we propose are well-suited to the ordinal nature of this variable. Our empirical results, which are supported by robust statistical inference, are twofolds. First, BMI categories are better distributed in France than in the UK, and in the UK than in the US for the two genders. Second, BMI categories happen to be more equally distributed among men than among women in all three countries.
Keywords Ordinal, Gender, Effciency, Equality, Body mass index
Publication HAL Google Scholar
Abstract We show that a majoritarian relation is, among all conceivable binary relations, the most representative of the profile of preferences from which it emanates. We define “the most representative” to mean that it minimizes the sum of distances between itself and the preferences in the profile for a given distance function. We identify a necessary and sufficient condition for such a distance to always be minimized by a majoritarian relation. This condition requires the distance to be additive with respect to a plausible notion of compromise between preferences. The well-known Kemeny distance does satisfy this property, along with many others. All distances that satisfy this property can be written as a sum of strictly positive weights assigned to the ordered pairs of alternatives by which any two preferences differ.
Keywords Aggregation, Distance, Majority, Binary relations
Publication HAL Google Scholar
Abstract This paper proposes two dominance criteria for evaluating education systems described as joint distributions of the pupils’ cognitive skill achievements and family backgrounds. The first criterion is the smallest transitive ranking of education systems compatible with three elementary principles. The first principle requires the favorable recording of any improvement in the cognitive skill of a child with a given family background . The second principle demands that any child’s cognitive skill be all the more favourably appraised as the child is coming from an unfavourable background. The third principle states that when two different skills and family backgrounds are allocated between two children, it is preferable that the high skill be given to the low background child than the other way around. Our second criterion adds to the three principles the elitist requirement that a mean-preserving spread in the skills of two children with the same background be recorded favorably. We apply our criteria to the ranking of education systems of 43 countries, where we measure cognitive skills by PISA score in mathematics and famly background by the largest of the two parents’International Socio Economic Index. Our criteria conclusively compare about 19% of all the possible pairs of countries.
Keywords Dominance, Opportunities, Maths scores, International comparisons, Family background, Inequality, Education
Publication HAL Google Scholar
Abstract We show that a majoritarian relation is, among all conceivable binary relations, the most representative of the profile of preferences from which it emanates. We define ''the most representative'' to mean that it minimizes the sum of distances between itself and the preferences in the profile for a given distance function. We identify a necessary and sufficient condition for such a distance to always be minimized by a majoritarian relation. This condition requires the distance to be additive with respect to a plausible notion of compromise between preferences. The well-known Kemeny distance does satisfy this property, along with many others. All distances that satisfy this property can be written as a sum of strictly positive weights assigned to the ordered pairs of alternatives by which any two preferences differ.
Keywords Majority, Distance, Binary Relation, Aggregation
HAL Google Scholar
Abstract We establish an equivalence between three criteria for comparing dis- tributions of an ordinal variable taking finitely many values. The first criterion is the possibility of going from one distribution to the other by a finite sequence of increments and/or Hammond transfers. The latter transfers are like the Pigou-Dalton ones, but without the requirement that the amount transferred be fixed. The second criterion is the unanimity of all comparisons of the distributions performed by a class of additively separable social evaluation functions. The third criterion is a new statis- tical test based on a weighted recursion of the cumulative distribution. We also identify an exact test for the possibility of going from one dis- tribution to another by a finite sequence of Hammond transfers only. An illustration of the usefulness of our approach for evaluating distributions of self-reported happiness level is also provided
Keywords Inequality, Ordinal, Transfers, Dominance, Distributions
Publication HAL Google Scholar
Abstract This article establishes an equivalence between four incomplete rankings of distributions of income among agents who are vertically differentiated with respect to some nonincome characteristic (health, household size, etc.). The first ranking is the possibility of going from one distribution to the other by a finite sequence of income transfers from richer and more highly ranked agents to poorer and less highly ranked ones. The second ranking is the unanimity among utilitarian planners who assume that agents' marginal utility of income is decreasing with respect to both income and the source of vertical differentiation. The third ranking is the Bourguignon (Journal of Econometrics, 42 (1989), 67–80) Ordered Poverty Gap dominance criterion. The fourth ranking is a new dominance criterion based on cumulative lowest incomes.
Publication HAL Google Scholar
Abstract La recherche en sciences humaines et sociales (SHS), à qui l’on pose régulièrement la question de son « utilité », a été massivement mobilisée dans la première partie de l’année 2020, tant par les médias et les institutions. Elle s’est montrée d’une grande réactivité, en adaptant ses calendriers et ses objectifs, en modifiant ses formats d’interventions (wébinaires, cours en distanciel). Chercheuses et chercheurs, enseignant(e)s-chercheurs ont été présents, et ce malgré des inégalités générées par le confinement dans le travail de recherche, notamment en termes de genre. Le présent travail a pour ambition de proposer à son lecteur une analyse mobilisant les travaux des SHS dans leur ensemble. Sans prétendre à l’exhaustivité, il tisse les fils, à travers les questions qu’il aborde, d’une discipline à une autre, composant un ensemble dans lequel les SHS entrent en résonance les unes avec les autres, déploient leur complémentarité, et créent une analyse commune, qu’elles relèvent plutôt des sciences sociales ou des humanités. Il a pour objectif de rendre manifeste un capital scientifique des SHS en tant que telles, pour aborder les différents questionnements que suscite la pandémie de Covid-19. La recherche actuelle en SHS sur la pandémie, sa gestion politique, et ses enjeux, ne s’élabore pas ex nihilo. Tout en prenant la mesure de la spécificité des temps présents, elle s’appuie sur un ensemble de cadres théoriques, de méthodes, d’analyses élaborés dans d’autres contextes, remobilisés, réactualisés, enrichis à la lumière des problématiques associées à la pandémie de Covid 19. Par ailleurs, le parti-pris de ce travail a été de tenir compte d’emblée de la dimension mondiale de la pandémie, et de ne pas s’en tenir à la situation française. Ainsi, plusieurs contextes nationaux, voire continentaux sont explorés sur tel ou tel point et la dimension mondiale de la pandémie y est prise en compte en tant que telle. Enfin, ce document s’intéresse aussi à la manière même dont les sciences humaines et sociales se sont mobilisées, en France, dans le contexte de la pandémie de Covid 19, aux formes collaboratives, aux pratiques pluridisciplinaires particulièrement adoptées face à cette pandémie. Il se structure en cinq parties : la première porte sur la manière dont les SHS font de la crise une question et un objet de connaissance (A – Du cadrage de la crise dans l’espace public à la crise comme objet de connaissance - l’exemple de la France). La seconde aborde un point saillant des analyses élaborées au cours des derniers mois, qui envisagent la pandémie comme un révélateur, voire un amplificateur d’enjeux pré-existants (B). Puis, la troisième partie s’intéresse aux sociétés et aux gouvernements confrontés à la pandémie (C), autrement dit aux formes de la gestion de la crise par le pouvoir politique, à la mobilisation des sciences et à l’exercice du pouvoir, ainsi qu’aux mesures prises et aux attitudes des populations au regard de ces mesures. La quatrième partie présente la façon dont le temps de la pandémie a été traversé de questionnements pour le futur, questionnements qui à leur tour impriment des orientations pour la recherche en SHS (D. Se réinventer en temps de pandémie). Enfin, la cinquième et dernière partie invite le lecteur à découvrir comment les SHS se sont mobilisées en temps de pandémie, comment elles ont collaboré et entrepris de documenter à chaud la crise sanitaire tout en acceptant de voir se renouveler questions, objets, méthodes sous l’effet de cette crise (E. Quand la crise invite aux collaborations et à une réflexion sur le « transfert » des connaissances).
HAL Google Scholar
Abstract We examine the problem of providing a non-rival and excludable public good to individuals with the same preferences and differing contributing capacities. Exclusion from the public good is costly in the sense that if two different quantities of the public good are consumed in the community, then the sum of the costs of providing the two quantities must be borne. By contrast, costless exclusion only requires the cost of the largest quantity consumed of the public good to be financed. We show that despite its important cost, providing public goods in different quantities is often part of any optimal provision of public good when the public authority is imperfectly informed about the agents' contributive capacities. In the specific situation where individuals have an additively separable logarithmic utility function, we provide a complete characterization of the optimal exclusion structure in the two-type case. We also show that the preference for such a costly exclusion is more likely when the heterogeneity in the population or income is large, and when the aversion to utility inequality is important.
Keywords Costly exclusion, Public goods, Asymmetric information, Mechanism design
Publication HAL Google Scholar
Abstract What would be the analogue of the Lorenz quasi-ordering when the variable of interest is continuous and of a purely ordinal nature? We argue that it is possible to derive such a criterion by substituting for the Pigou-Dalton transfer used in the standard inequality literature what we refer to as a Hammond progressive transfer. According to this criterion, one distribution of utilities is considered to be less unequal than another if it is judged better by both the lexicographic extensions of the maximin and the minimax, henceforth referred to as the leximin and the antileximax, respectively. If one imposes in addition that an increase in someone’s utility makes the society better off, then one is left with the leximin, while the requirement that society welfare increases as the result of a decrease of one person’s utility gives the antileximax criterion. Incidentally, the paper provides an alternative and simple characterisation of the leximin principle widely used in the social choice and welfare literature.
Keywords Leximin, Antileximax, Ordinal inequality, Hammond equity principle, Inégalité ordinale, Equité au sens de Hammond, Leximin, Antileximax
Publication HAL Google Scholar
Abstract We provide an axiomatic characterization of a family of criteria for ranking completely uncertain and/or ambiguous decisions. A completely uncertain decision is described by the set of all its consequences (assumed to be finite). An ambiguous decision is described as a set of possible probability distributions over a set of prizes. Every criterion in the family compares sets on the basis of their conditional expected utility , for some “likelihood” function taking strictly positive values and some utility function both having the universe of alternatives as their domain.
Keywords D81, Axioms JEL classification numbers D80, Ranking Sets, Expected Utility, Conditional Probabilities, Ambiguity, Ignorance
Publication HAL Google Scholar
Abstract In this paper, we theoretically characterize robust empirically implementable normative criteria for evaluating socially risky situations. Socially risky situations are modeled as distributions, among individuals, of lotteries on a finite set of state-contingent pecuniary consequences. Individuals are assumed to have selfish Von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences for these socially risky situations. We provide empirically implementable criteria that coincide with the unanimity, over a reasonably large class of such individual preferences, of anonymous and Pareto-inclusive Von Neuman Morgenstern social rankings of risks. The implementable criteria can be interpreted as sequential expected poverty dominance.An illustration of the usefulness of the criteria for comparing the exposure to unemployment risk of different segments of the French and US workforce is also provided.
Keywords Expected poverty, Unemployment, Social welfare, Risk, Dominance
Publication HAL Google Scholar
Abstract This paper examines the segregative properties of endogenous processes of jurisdiction formation in the presence of a competitive land market. In the considered model, a continuum of households with different income levels and the same preference for local public goods, private spending and housing choose a location from a finite set. Each location has an initial endowment of housing that is priced competitively and that belongs to absentee landlords. Each location is also endowed with a specific technology for producing public goods. Households' preferences are assumed to be homothetically separable between local public goods on the one hand and private spending and housing on the other. Public goods provision is financed by a given, but unspecified, mixture of (linear) wealth and housing taxes. It is shown that stable jurisdiction structures are segregated by income only if households have a Marshallian demand for any public good (conditionally on the quantities of the other public goods) that is a monotonic function of the price of private spending. It is also shown that if there is only one public good, or if household preferences are additively separable between public and private goods, then the condition is also sufficient for segregation. Examples showing the sensitivity of the results to the assumptions of homothetic separability and additive separability are also provided.
Keywords Segregation, Mobility, Local taxes, Land market, Jurisdictions
Publication HAL Google Scholar
Abstract This paper examines the segregative properties of Tiebout-type process of jurisdiction formation by freely mobile households in the presence of a central government which makes equalization transfers across jurisdictions so as to maximize a generalized utilitarian or a max–min objective. It is shown that the introduction of such a central government significantly affects the set of stable jurisdiction structures. It is also shown that the class of households additively separable preferences that guarantees the wealth segregation of any stable jurisdiction structure is unaffected by the presence of a central government if this government uses a generalized utilitarian objective. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013
Keywords Economie quantitative
Publication HAL Google Scholar
Abstract We show that it is possible to reconcile the utilitarian and welfarist principles under the requirement of unanimity provided that the set of profiles over which the consensus is attained is rich enough. More precisely, we identify a closedness condition which, if satisfied by a class of n-tuples of utility functions, guarantees that the rankings of social states induced by utilitarian and welfarist unanimities over that class are identical. We illustrate the importance of the result for the measurement of unidimensional as well as multidimensional inequalities from a dominance point of view. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013
Keywords Economie quantitative
Publication HAL Google Scholar
Abstract This paper contrasts conventional real GDP and price indicators of living standard, interpreted as revealing information on welfare, with others, that aim at reflecting individual freedom. It is argued that freedom-based indices are easier to use and interpret than traditional real GDP ones. Illustrations of the differences between the two classes of indices are provided for international comparisons, as well as for the evaluation of growth and inflation in France
Keywords Freedom, Welfare, Price index, Per capita GDP, Growth, International comparisons
Publication HAL Google Scholar
Abstract The paper provides robust normative comparisons of 12 OECD countries based on their distributions of disposable income and access to two regional public goods: infant mortality and pupil-teacher ratios at public schools. Comparisons are performed using two and three-dimensional dominance criteria that coincide with the unanimity of utilitarian judgments taken over specific classes of utility functions. The criteria succeed in ranking conclusively about 30% of all possible comparisons in the two-dimensional case, compared with 67% for one-dimensional income-based comparisons and 6% for three-dimensional ones. Introducing local public goods seems to worsen the relative standing of Anglo-Saxon countries.
Keywords Regional public goods, Disposable income, Infant mortality, Pupil-teacher ratios at public schools, International comparisons, OECD countries
Publication HAL Google Scholar
Abstract This paper provides a simple uni…ed axiomatic framework for appraising the central tendency of distributions of a single attribute (pie) among a collection of individuals depending upon the available measurement of the attribute. Two types of measurement are considered: cardinal and ordinal. For each of them, three properties are posited on an ordering of distributions of numbers among individuals. The two …rst properties are the anonymity requirement that permutations of the same list of numbers be equivalent and the weak Pareto requirement that a strict increase in the value of the variable for all individuals be favorably appraised. The third property requires that inverting the numerical measurement of the variable leads to an inversion of the ranking of the any two distributions to which the inversion is applied. The mean of a distribution is shown to be the only ordering of distributions consistent with cardinal measurability that satis…es those three requirements in the cardinal context while the median is the only such ranking consistent with ordinal measurability of the variable that sat-is…es those same requirement if the number of individuals is odd. If the number of individuals is even, then those three requirements applied to the ordinal context are shown to be inconsistent.
Keywords Consistency, Measurement, Ordinal, Cardinal, Median, Mean
Download HAL Google Scholar
Abstract The paper provides an axiomatic characterization of a family of rank dependent weighted average utility criteria applicable to decisions under ignorance or objective ambiguity. A decision under ignorance is described by the finite set of its final consequences while a decision under objective ambiguity is described by a finite set of probability distributions over a set of final consequences. The criteria characterized are those that assign to every element in a set a weight that depends upon the rank of this element if it was available for sure (or non-ambiguously) and that compare sets on the basis of their weighted utility for some utility function. A specific subfamily of these criteria that requires the weights to be proportional to each other is also characterized.
Keywords Ignorance, Ambiguity, Ranking Sets, Axioms, Ranks, Weights, Utility
Download HAL Google Scholar
Abstract This paper provides a robust criterion for evaluating the allocation of opportunities among various groups. We envisage the problem of comparing these allocations from the view point of an ethical observer placed behind a veil of ignorance with respect to the group in which he/she could end up. We give justi…cation for such an ethical observer to evaluate these allocations of opportunities on the basis of an expected valuation of the expected utility of being in a group assuming an equal probability of falling in every group. We identify a criterion for comparing societies that is agreed upon by all such ethical observers who exhibit aversion to inequality of opportunities. The criterion happens to be a conic extension of zonotope inclusion criterion. We provide various interpretations of this criterion as well as some illustrations of its possible use, notably in the Indian context where we evaluate the inequalities of educational opportunities among castes and genders o¤ered by Indian states.
Keywords Education, Gender, Zonotopes, Groups, Equalizing opportunities
Download HAL Google Scholar
Abstract This paper examines how voluntary contributions to a public good are affected by the contributors' heterogeneity in beliefs about the uncertain impact of their contributions. It assumes that contributors have Savagian preferences that are represented by a two-state-dependent expected utility function and different beliefs about the benefit that will result from the sum of their contributions. We establish general comparative statics results regarding the effect of specific changes in the distribution of beliefs on the (unique) Nash equilibrium provision of the public good, under certain conditions imposed on the preferences. We specifically show that the equilibrium public good provision is increasing with respect to both first and second order stochastic dominance changes in the distribution of beliefs. Hence, increasing the contributors' optimism about the uncertain benefit of their contributions increases aggregate public good provision provision, as does any homogenization of these beliefs around their mean.
Keywords Optimism, Consensus, Beliefs, Uncertainty, Public good, Voluntary provision
Download HAL Google Scholar
Abstract We propose a framework for the analysis of choice behavior when the later explicitly depends upon time. We relate this framework to the traditional setting from which time is absent. We illustrate the usefulness of the introduction of time by proposing three possible models of choice behavior in such a framework: (i) changing preferences, (ii) preference formation by trial and error, and (iii) choice with endogenous status-quo bias. We provide a full characterization of each of these three choice models by means of revealed preference-like axioms that could not be formulated in a timeless setting.
Keywords Choice behavior, Time, Revealed preferences, Changing preferences, Learning by trial-and-error, Inertia bias
Download HAL Google Scholar
Abstract This paper establishes an equivalence between three incomplete rankings of distributions of income among agents that are vertically differentiated with respect to some other non-income characteristic (health, household size, etc.). The first ranking is that associated with the possibility of going from one distribution to the other by a finite sequence of income transfers from richer and more highly ranked agents to poorer and less highly ranked ones. The second ranking is the unanimity of all comparisons of two distributions made by a utilitarian planer who assumes that agents convert income into utility by the same function exhibiting a marginal utility of income that is decreasing with respect to both income and the source of vertical differentiation. The third ranking is the Bourguignon (1989) ordered poverty gap dominance criterion.
Keywords Equalization, Transfers, Heterogenous agents, Poverty gap, Dominance, Utilitarianism
Download HAL Google Scholar
Abstract What would be the analogue of the Lorenz quasi-ordering when the variable of interest is of a purely ordinal nature? We argue that it is possible to derive such a criterion by substituting for the Pigou-Dalton transfer used in the standard inequality literature what we refer to as a Hammond progressive transfer. According to this criterion, one distribution of utilities is considered to be less unequal than another if it is judged better by both the lexicographic extensions of the maximin and the minimax, henceforth referred to as the leximin and the antileximax, respectively. If one imposes in addition that an increase in someone’s utility makes the society better off, then one is left with the leximin, while the requirement that society welfare increases as the result of a decrease of one person’s utility gives the antileximax criterion. Incidently, the paper provides an alternative and simple characterisation of the leximin principle widely used in the social choice and welfare literature.
Keywords Ordinal inequality, Hammond equity axiom, Leximin, Antileximax
Download HAL Google Scholar
Abstract In this paper, we appraise the recent evolution of the distribution of individuals’ risk of cardiovascular diseases (CVD) in France among both men and women using new normative criteria. An individual risk of CVD is described by a probability of getting such a disease. Building on the framework of Gravel and Tarroux (2015), we assume that individuals, who differ by their income, have Von Neuman-Morgenstern (VNM) preferences over such risks. We appeal to Harsanyi’s aggregation theorem to provide empirically implementable dominance criteria that coincide with the unanimity, taken over a large class of such individual preferences, of anonymous and Pareto-inclusive VNM social rankings of distributions of individuals’ risk of CVD. The implementable criteria that we obtain are Sequential headcount poverty dominance and Sequential headcount affluence dominance. We apply these criteria to the distribution of cardiovascular risks among French men and women on the 2006-2010 period. Probabilities of CVD are assigned to individuals on the basis of a logit model estimated on both the men and the women samples for each of the two years. Our main empirical result is that men and women were differently affected by evolution in the distribution of CVD risks between 2006 and 2010. Specifically, the distribution improved for women but did not improve for men.
Keywords Dominance, Risk, Ex ante social welfare, State-dependent expected utility, Poverty, Health, Cardiovascular diseases
Download HAL Google Scholar
Abstract We provide an axiomatic characterization of a family of criteria for ranking completely uncertain and/or ambiguous decisions. A completely uncertain decision is described by the set of all its consequences (assumed to be finite). An ambiguous decision is described as a finite set of possible probability distributions over a finite set of prices. Every criterion in the family compares sets on the basis of their conditional expected utility, for some probability function taking strictly positive values and some utility function both having the universe of alternatives as their domain.
Keywords Ignorance, Ambiguity, Conditional Probabilities, Expected Utility, Ranking Sets, Axioms
Download HAL Google Scholar
Abstract This paper establishes foundational equivalences between alternative criteria for comparing distributions of an ordinally measurable attribute. A first criterion is associated with the possibility of going from distribution to the other by a finite sequence of two elementary operations: increments of the attribute and Hammond transfers. The later transfers are like the famous Pigou-Dalton ones, but without the requirement - that would be senseless in an ordinal setting - that the "amount" transferred from the "rich" to the "poor" is fixed. A second criterion is a new easy-to-use statistical criterion associated to a specifically weighted recursion on the cumulative density of the distribution function. A third criterion is that resulting from the comparison of numerical values assigned to distributions by a large class of additively separable social evaluation functions. Dual versions of these criteria are also considered and alternative equivalence results are established. Illustrations of the criteria are also provided.
Keywords Ordinal, Qualitative, Health, Inequality, Hammond Transfers, Increments, Dominance
Download HAL Google Scholar
Abstract This paper compares distributions of Body Mass Index (BMI) among men and women in France, the US and the UK on the basis of a new normative criterion. Comparing distributions of BMI from a normative standpoint is conceptually challenging because of the ordinal nature of the variable. Our normative criterion is well-suited to handle this issue. It coincides with the possibility of moving from the dominated distribution to the dominating one by a finite sequence of Hammond transfers and/or elementary efficiency gains. An additional difficulty with BMI is that it is not monotonically increasing (or decreasing) with health or well-being. We therefore perform our analysis by considering all health-consistent rankings of BMI values. Our empirical results are striking. For a large class of these rankings of BMI values, it is shown that the distribution of BMI in France has worsened on the period 2008-2010 for both men and women according to first order dominance. It is also shown that for most welfare rankings of BMI values, the distribution of BMI is worse in every period in the female population than in the male one in all three countries.
Keywords Body weight, Equality, Genders, Categorical variables
Download HAL Google Scholar
Abstract This paper discusses the problem of optimal design of a jurisdiction structure from the view point of a welfarist social planner when households with identical utility functions for non-rival public good and private consumption have private information about their contributive capacities. It shows that the superiority of a centralized provision of a non-rival public good over a federal one does not always hold. Specifically, when differences in households contributive capacities are large, it is better to provide the public good in several distinct jurisdictions rather than to pool these jurisdictions into a single one. In the specific case where households have logarithmic utilities, the paper provides a complete characterization of the optimal jurisdiction structure in the two-type case. "C'est pour unir les avantages divers qui résultent de la grandeur et de la petitesse des nations que le fédératif a été créé." (Alexis de Toqueville)
Keywords Federalism, Jurisdictions, Asymmetric information, Equalization, City mergers
Download HAL Google Scholar