Martin Dhaussy

European public policies incentivize the deployment of fast-charging (DC) infrastructure based on the premise that local EV adoption drives public charging demand. We invalidate this assumption using a dual-layer dataset combining a proprietary panel of 15,314 monthly connector utilization observations with exhaustive geo-spatial network data (12,000 stations) in France. On the demand side, we document a "Residential Paradox" that creates "Zombie" assets. Using a fixed-effects model on charging sessions, we show that while local wealth positively predicts utilization for AC (slow) chargers, it has a null or negative interaction with DC (fast) utilization. We attribute this to a structural substitution effect: in wealthier municipalities, the prevalence of private parking renders public fast-charging redundant. On the supply side, we demonstrate that connection subsidies sustain this misallocation. Rather than correcting for local demand, market actors mitigate risk by minimizing deployment costs via a "Copper Trap." Controlling for population density, we find that "Speculator" entrants locate stations significantly closer to grid transformers than service-driven incumbents (p<0.05). A counterfactual analysis estimates that this "grid-hugging" strategy generated a subsidy leakage of €48.6 million in avoided civil engineering costs—public funds captured as operator margin rather than delivered to users. We conclude that current regulation fosters a double market failure: it directs capital toward areas where private substitution kills demand, and incentivizes locations at grid edges where user utility is minimized, resulting in a €73 million fleet of socially sub-optimal assets.