Information provision is a relatively recent but steadily growing environmental policy tool. Its emergency and topicality are due to the current escalation of ecological threats. Meanwhile, its high complexity and flexibility require a comprehensive approach to its design, which has to be tailored for specific characteristics of production process, market structure, and regulatory goals. This work proposes such an approach and builds a framework based on a three-level mathematical program extending well-known two-level Stackelberg game by introducing one more economic agent and one extra level of this sequential game. This study provides simple and very intuitive algorithms to compute optimal multi-tier information provision policies, both mandatory and voluntary. The paper urges for the wide implementation of such efficient environmental policy design tools.
Environmental policies are among the priorities of the UN agenda and figure highly in national and international policy agendas. This brief focuses on environ-mental taxes and green public procurement (GPP). These two environmental po-licy instruments differ in political viability and in the impact they have on consu-mers and producers. The brief provides a comparative analysis of their efficiency in closed and open economy and reveals the opportunities and threats of (un)harmo-nised environmental policy across countries. The results allow to consider particu-lar implications for the collaboration of EU-MENA countries.