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Publications

An Empirical Assessment of the Drivers of Formal and Informal Childcare Demand in European CountriesJournal articleLaurène Thil, Laté A. Lawson and Mathieu Lefebvre, Social Indicators Research, Volume 170, pp. 581-608, 2023

How does the mother’s labour supply affect the household’s demand for childcare? And thus are formal and informal childcare substitutable? In this paper, we address these two questions using micro-data for 14 European countries observed over the period between 2010 and 2017. Relying on a Control Function Approach to account for the endogeneity between childcare and the mothers’ labour supply, we identify different factors affecting the demand for formal and informal childcare. The results show that the mother’s labour supply is a key element in understanding the demand for childcare and suggest that the more the mother participates in the labour market, the higher the household’s demand for childcare services. Moreover, our results support the substitutability hypothesis between formal and informal childcare. Policymakers aiming to promote mothers’ employment should increase the availability of formal childcare services, as this will increase labour supply by mothers and reduce the use of informal care arrangements.

Information disclosure under liability: an experiment on public badsJournal articleJulien Jacob, Eve-Angéline Lambert, Mathieu Lefebvre and Sarah Van Driessche, Social Choice and Welfare, Volume 61, Issue 1, pp. 155-197, 2023

We experimentally investigate the impact of information disclosure on managing common harms that are caused jointly by a group of liable agents. Subjects interact in a public bad setting and must choose ex ante how much to contribute in order to reduce the probability of causing a common damage. If a damage occurs, subjects bear a part of the loss according to the liability-sharing rule in force. We consider two existing rules: a per capita rule and a proportional rule. Our aim is to analyze the relative impact of information disclosure under each rule. We show that information disclosure increases contributions only under a per capita rule. This result challenges the classical results regarding the positive effects of information disclosure, since we show that this impact may depend upon the legal context. We also show that while a proportional rule leads to higher contributions than a per capita one, the positive effect of disclosure on a per capita rule makes it as efficient as a proportional rule without information disclosure.

Other-regarding preferences and giving decision in a risky environment: experimental evidenceJournal articleMickael Beaud, Mathieu Lefebvre and Julie Rosaz, Review of Economic Design, Volume 27, Issue 2, pp. 359-385, 2023

We investigate whether and how an individual giving decision is affected in risky environments in which the recipient’s wealth is random. We demonstrate that, under risk neutrality, the donation of dictators with a purely ex post view of fairness should, in general, be affected by the riskiness of the recipient’s payoff, while dictators with a purely ex ante view should not be. Furthermore, we observe that some influential inequality aversion preferences functions yield opposite predictions when we consider ex post view of fairness. Hence, we report on dictator games laboratory experiments in which the recipient’s wealth is exposed to an actuarially neutral and additive background risk. Our experimental data show no statistically significant impact of the recipient’s risk exposure on dictators’ giving decisions. This result appears robust to both the experimental design (within subjects or between subjects) and the origin of the recipient’s risk exposure (chosen by the recipient or imposed on the recipient). Although we cannot sharply validate or invalidate alternative fairness theories, the whole pattern of our experimental data can be simply explained by assuming ex ante view of fairness and risk neutrality.

Counting the missing poor in pre-industrial societiesJournal articleMathieu Lefebvre, Cliometrica, Volume 17, Issue 1, pp. 155-183, 2023

Under income-differentiated mortality, poverty measures suffer from a selection bias: they do not count the missing poor (i.e., persons who would have been counted as poor provided they did not die prematurely). The Pre-Industrial period being characterized by an evolutionary advantage (i.e., a higher number of surviving children per household) of the non-poor over the poor, one may expect that the missing poor bias is substantial during that period. This paper quantifies the missing poor bias in Pre-Industrial societies, by computing the hypothetical headcount poverty rates that would have prevailed provided the non-poor did not benefit from an evolutionary advantage over the poor. Using data on Pre-Industrial England and France, we show that the sign and size of the missing poor bias are sensitive to the degree of downward social mobility.

Nursing homes and mortality in Europe: Uncertain causalityJournal articleXavier Flawinne, Mathieu Lefebvre, Sergio Perelman, Pierre Pestieau and Jérôme Schoenmaeckers, Health Economics, Volume 32, Issue 1, pp. 134-154, 2023

The current health crisis has particularly affected the elderly population. Nursing homes have unfortunately experienced a relatively large number of deaths. On the basis of this observation and working with European data (from SHARE), we want to check whether nursing homes were lending themselves to excess mortality even before the pandemic. Controlling for a number of important characteristics of the elderly population in and outside nursing homes, we conjecture that the difference in mortality between those two samples is to be attributed to the way nursing homes are designed and organized. Using matching methods, we observe excess mortality in Sweden, Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, Czech Republic and Estonia but not in the Netherlands, Denmark, Austria, France, Luxembourg, Italy and Spain. This raises the question of the organization and management of these nursing homes, but also of their design and financing.

Promoting socially desirable behaviors through persuasion and commitment: Experimental evidenceJournal articleCécile Bazart, Mathieu Lefebvre and Julie Rosaz, Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, Volume 101, pp. 101931, 2022

Through a series of experiments, this paper tests the relative efficiency of persuasion and commitment schemes to increase and sustain contribution levels in a Voluntary Contribution Game. The design allows us to compare a baseline consisting of a repeated public good game to four treatments of the same game in which we successively introduce a persuasion message, commitment devices, and communication between subjects. Our results suggest that these non-monetary procedures significantly increase cooperation and reduce the decay of contributions across periods.

Are preferences for work reference dependent or time nonseparable? New experimental evidenceJournal articleSam Cosaert, Mathieu Lefebvre and Ludivine Martin, European Economic Review, Volume 148, pp. 104206, 2022

Tests of labor supply models often rely on wages. However, wage variation alone generally cannot disentangle the classical time separable model and its extensions: reference dependent preferences (income targeting) and time nonseparable preferences (disutility spillovers; timing-specific preferences). We set up a novel laboratory experiment in which individuals choose their working time. We vary, independently, wages, historical income paths, and cumulative past work. We also vary the timing of experimental sessions. Statistical tests and stochastic revealed preference methods cannot reject the classical model in favor of income targeting or disutility spillovers, but the data suggest that labor supply varies by time-of-the-day.

Long-lasting effects of incentives and social preference: A public goods experimentJournal articleMaho Nakagawa, Mathieu Lefebvre and Anne Stenger, PLOS ONE, Volume 17, Issue 8, pp. e0273014, 2022

This paper addresses the question of the effectiveness and permanence of temporary incentives to contribute to a public good. Using a common experimental framework, we investigate the effects of a recommendation that takes the form of an exhortative message to contribute, a monetary punishment and a non-monetary reward to sustain high levels of contributions. In particular, we shed light on the differential impact these mechanisms have on heterogeneous types of agents. The results show that all three incentives increase contributions compared to a pre-phase where there is no incentive. Monetary sanctions lead to the highest contributions, but a sudden drop in contributions is observed once the incentive to punish is removed. On the contrary, Recommendation leads to the lowest contributions but maintains a long-lasting impact in the Post-policy phase. In particular, it makes free-riders increase their contribution over time in the post-incentive phase. Finally, non-monetary reward backfires against those who are weakly conditional cooperators. Our findings emphasize the importance of designing and maintaining incentives not only for free-riders, but for strong and weak conditional cooperators as well, depending on characteristics of the incentives.

Knowledge acquisition or incentive to foster coordination? A real-effort weak-link experiment with craftsmenJournal articleMathieu Lefebvre and Lucie Martin- Bon de Longchamp, Journal of Behavioral Economics for Policy, Issue S1, pp. 93-107, 2022

This paper presents an artefactual field experiment with craftsmen working on renovation projects to assess the effect of training programs and incentive schemes on coordination. Workers frequently fail to coordinate their tasks when not supervised by a project coordinator. This is particularly important in the construction sector where it leads to a lack of final performance in buildings. We introduce two different incentives: a first contract paying craftsmen only according to their individual performance, and a second contract paying a group of three craftsmen with a weak-link payment according to the group’s worst performance. In addition, we test these incentives on two different subject groups: one is composed of craftsmen trained to coordinate their tasks, and the others are not. The results suggest that trained subjects coordinate at significantly higher effort levels than non-trained subjects when facing an individual-based incentive. However, when facing a group-based incentive, non-trained subjects seem to ”catch up” trained subjects in terms of coordination level, while these latter subjects do not significantly increase their performance level.

Preferences and strategic behavior in public goods gamesJournal articleGilles Grandjean, Mathieu Lefebvre and Marco Mantovani, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Volume 195, pp. 171-185, 2022

In finitely repeated public goods games, contributions are initially high, and gradually decrease over time. Two main explanations are consistent with this pattern: (i) the population is composed of free-riders, who never contribute, and conditional cooperators, who contribute if others do so as well; (ii) strategic players contribute to sustain mutually beneficial future cooperation, but reduce their contributions as the end of the game approaches. This paper analyzes experimentally these explanations, by manipulating group composition to form homogeneous groups on both the preference and the strategic ability dimensions. Our results highlight the role of strategic ability in sustaining contributions, and suggest that the interaction between the two dimensions also matters: we find that groups that sustain high levels of cooperation are composed of members who share a common inclination toward cooperation and also have the strategic abilities to recognize and reap the benefits of enduring cooperation.