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VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//AMSE//Event Calendar//FR
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BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:event-10113@www.amse-aixmarseille.fr
DTSTAMP:20260422T121344Z
CREATED:20260422T121344Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260422T121344Z
STATUS:CONFIRMED
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:Economic theory seminar - Joseph J. Ruggiero
DTSTART:20230525T100000Z
DTEND:20230525T110000Z
DESCRIPTION:Social connections matter for vote buying\, yet most analyses d
 o not specify the nature of interdependence between actors explicitly. We 
 provide a formal model of elections in which candidates may offer private 
 transfers to policy-motivated voters connected on a social network. Investi
 gation of deep parameters governing social structure allows for comparison
  across societies without the need to consider specific realizations. In e
 quilibrium\, transfers are determined primarily by group fractionalization 
 and homophily\, with density mattering only indirectly. Inequalities are dr
 iven by disproportionate targeting of minorities. Additionally\, we conside
 r heterogeneous information between candidates\, clarifying the main role 
 of density as a source of more precise information for candidates and demo
 nstrating that homophily can endogenously generate in-group favoritism. The
 se results highlight the importance of social structure\, moving beyond th
 e existing focus on individual targeting.\\n\\nContact: Gaëtan Fournier: g
 aetan.fournier[at]univ-amu.fr\n\nPlus d'informations: https://www.amse-aixm
 arseille.fr/en/events/joseph-j-ruggiero-2
LOCATION:Îlot Bernard du Bois - Salle 16\, AMU - AMSE\, 5-9 boulevard Maur
 ice Bourdet\, 13001 Marseille
URL;VALUE=URI:https://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/en/events/joseph-j-ruggiero-2
CONTACT:Gaëtan Fournier: gaetan.fournier[at]univ-amu.fr
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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