BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//AMSE//Event Calendar//FR
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:event-10584@www.amse-aixmarseille.fr
DTSTAMP:20260421T153820Z
CREATED:20260421T153820Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260421T153820Z
STATUS:CONFIRMED
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:Economic theory seminar - Moritz Loewenfeld
DTSTART:20231020T100000Z
DTEND:20231020T110000Z
DESCRIPTION:The outcome bias induces economic agents to be rewarded or puni
 shed based on random outcomes irrelevant to assessing performance. In a the
 ory-guided experiment\, I study how the outcome bias shapes agents’ choic
 es\, which is crucial to understanding welfare implications. I propose a si
 mple model of outcome bias. Its key prediction is that the outcome bias can
  trick principals into incentivizing agents to choose their least favorite 
 action when it is most likely to yield a higher payoff than the alternative
 s. In the experiment\, agents\, acting on behalf of principals\, choose bet
 ween two lotteries. One lottery is clearly optimal (FOSD)\, but it yields a
  lower payoff in most states. Principals perfectly observe the agent’s ch
 oice and the realized state of the world and decide whether to award a bonu
 s to the agent. Despite having a revealed preference for the dominant lotte
 ry\, principals are more likely to award the bonus for the dominant lottery
 . Stated beliefs show that agents anticipate these perverse incentives. In 
 what appears to be a failure of strategic reasoning\, most agents choose th
 e dominant lottery\, contrary to their beliefs. Strategically sophisticated
  agents are more likely to choose a dominated lottery when they believe to 
 have an incentive to do so. The results suggest that the outcome bias might
  be most relevant in settings with sophisticated agents such as politicians
 \, CEOs\, or fund managers. Structural estimation suggests that principals 
 fall almost exclusively into one of two types: (near) fully outcome-biased 
 or (near) fully unbiased.\\n\\nContact: Gaëtan Fournier: gaetan.fournier[a
 t]univ-amu.fr\n\nPlus d'informations: https://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/en/e
 vents/moritz-loewenfeld-0
LOCATION:Îlot Bernard du Bois - Salle 15\, AMU - AMSE\, 5-9 boulevard Maur
 ice Bourdet\, 13001 Marseille
URL;VALUE=URI:https://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/en/events/moritz-loewenfeld-0
CONTACT:Gaëtan Fournier: gaetan.fournier[at]univ-amu.fr
TRANSP:OPAQUE
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR