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VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//AMSE//Event Calendar//FR
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BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:event-13122@www.amse-aixmarseille.fr
DTSTAMP:20260512T122000Z
CREATED:20260512T122000Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260512T122000Z
STATUS:CONFIRMED
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:phd seminar - Lancelot Chardel*\, Garance Desrousseaux**
DTSTART:20260519T090000Z
DTEND:20260519T101500Z
DESCRIPTION:*Using the ECB's AnaCredit supervisory register and Prentice--W
 illiams--Peterson stratified Cox models\, we study whether loan renegotiati
 ons between eurozone banks and non-bank financial intermediaries carry disc
 iplinary content or mask forbearance. We document three findings. While\, r
 enegotiation occurrence and intensity carry no information about subsequent
  default \; the type of the opening amendment does. Favorable and unfavorab
 le amendments both reduce default hazard\, while mixed amendments sharply i
 ncrease it. Group-affiliated NBFIs exhibit markedly lower baseline default 
 hazard. Critically\, the protective content of renegotiation is asymmetrica
 lly distorted for affiliates: favorable amendments lose informational conte
 nt (dilution) while unfavorable amendments gain it (credibility through rar
 ity). This asymmetric signature --- which no pure monitoring model generate
 s --- is consistent with strategic forbearance inside banking groups and su
 ggests that supervisors should track the type of renegotiations on bank–N
 BFI exposures\, not only their frequency.**Does relaxing financing constrai
 nts increase firm entry and firm performance? I exploit the introduction in
  2006 of a French unemployment insurance reform\, which allows unemployed i
 ndividuals to convert part of their unemployment benefits into upfront star
 tup capital. I implement a difference-in-differences strategy comparing sec
 tors and municipalities differentially exposed to the reform before and aft
 er 2006. Using administrative firm-level data matched with unemployment ins
 urance records\, I examine the reform’s effect on both the quantity and q
 uality of entrepreneurship\, measured through firm survival\, employment gr
 owth\, indebtedness\, and innovation-related outcomes.\\n\\nContact: Xavier
  Chatron-Colliet: xavier.chatron-colliet[at]univ-amu.frArmand Rigotti: arma
 nd.rigotti[at]univ-amu.fr\n\nPlus d'informations: https://www.amse-aixmarse
 ille.fr/en/events/lancelot-chardel-garance-desrousseaux
LOCATION:Îlot Bernard du Bois - Amphithéâtre\, AMU - AMSE\, 5-9 boulevar
 d Maurice Bourdet\, 13001 Marseille
URL;VALUE=URI:https://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/en/events/lancelot-chardel-garance-desrousseaux
CONTACT:Xavier Chatron-Colliet: xavier.chatron-colliet[at]univ-amu.frArmand
  Rigotti: armand.rigotti[at]univ-amu.fr
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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