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UID:event-7321@www.amse-aixmarseille.fr
DTSTAMP:20260501T042320Z
CREATED:20260501T042320Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260501T042320Z
STATUS:CONFIRMED
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:Development and political economy seminar - Michael Best
DTSTART:20210319T120000Z
DTEND:20210319T131500Z
DESCRIPTION:This project aims to understand the role that inequity—simila
 r households being treated differently by tax policy—plays in determining
  compliance with taxation. We do this by combining quasi-experimental varia
 tion and rich administrative data on tax liabilities and tax compliance wit
 h experimental variation from a novel survey experiment raising the salienc
 e of inequity in the context of the municipal property tax in the city of M
 anaus\, Brazil. Studying a 2011 reform\, we find that taxpayers’ complian
 ce decisions respond both to their own and their neighbors’ tax liabiliti
 es. Our experimental evidence suggests that increasing the salience of ineq
 uity leads respondents to find it more acceptable that those disadvantaged 
 by the tax system fail to comply with it. Our findings highlight an underap
 preciated additional cost of the widespread use of presumptive tax systems\
 , exacerbating the constraints of limited tax capacity to identifying and r
 edistributing between classes of taxpayers.\\n\\nContact: Timothée Demont:
  timothee.demont[at]univ-amu.frEva Raiber: eva.raiber[at]univ-amu.fr\n\nP
 lus d'informations: https://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/en/events/michael-best
 -2
LOCATION:MEGA
URL;VALUE=URI:https://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/en/events/michael-best-2
CONTACT:Timothée Demont:&nbsp\;timothee.demont[at]univ-amu.frEva Raiber:&n
 bsp\;eva.raiber[at]univ-amu.fr
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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