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PRODID:-//AMSE//Event Calendar//FR
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UID:event-7772@www.amse-aixmarseille.fr
DTSTAMP:20260531T115508Z
CREATED:20260531T115508Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260531T115508Z
STATUS:CONFIRMED
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:job market seminar - Moritz Janas
DTSTART:20210125T103000Z
DTEND:20210125T114500Z
DESCRIPTION:We study the choice of a principal to either delegate a decisio
 n to a group of careerist experts\, or to consult them individually and kee
 p the decision-making power. Our model predicts a trade-off between informa
 tion acquisition and information aggregation. On the one hand\, the expecte
 d benefit from being informed is larger in case the experts are consulted i
 ndividually. Hence\, the experts either acquire the same or a larger amount
  of information\, depending on the cost of information\, than in case of de
 legation. On the other hand\, any acquired information is better aggregated
  in case of delegation\, where experts can deliberate secretly. To test the
  model’s key predictions\, we run an experiment. The results from the lab
 oratory confirm the predicted trade-off\, despite some deviations from theo
 ry on the individual level.\n\nPlus d'informations: https://www.amse-aixmar
 seille.fr/en/events/moritz-janas-0
URL;VALUE=URI:https://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/en/events/moritz-janas-0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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