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UID:event-8318@www.amse-aixmarseille.fr
DTSTAMP:20260624T173541Z
CREATED:20260624T173541Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260624T173541Z
STATUS:CONFIRMED
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:Eco-lunch - Alberto Grillo
DTSTART:20211028T103000Z
DTEND:20211028T113000Z
DESCRIPTION:This paper studies cooperation and morality in economics\, with
  regard to the so-called Kantian behavior. I propose a theory for interpret
 ing the Kantian universalization principle in egalitarian terms\, when agen
 ts are asymmetrically situated. As such\, equivalent strategies are those t
 hat\, if played jointly\, yield equal payoff gains to the agents\, with res
 pect to some reference outcome. I show that the resulting equivalence relat
 ion satisfies a consistency property: agents optimizing under the constrain
 t of universalistic morality choose indeed equivalent strategies. The outco
 me of agents' interaction corresponds to the egalitarian solution in the as
 sociated bargaining problem\, which is Pareto-efficient under mild regulari
 ty conditions. I present two applications in a game of public good provisio
 n and in a voting model with costly turnout.\\n\\nContact: Nathalie Ferriè
 re: nathalie.ferriere[at]sciencespo-aix.frFederico Trionfetti: federico.t
 rionfetti[at]univ-amu.fr\n\nPlus d'informations: https://www.amse-aixmarsei
 lle.fr/en/events/alberto-grillo-2
LOCATION:MEGA - Salle Carine Nourry\, 424\, Chemin du Viaduc\, 13080 Aix-en
 -Provence
URL;VALUE=URI:https://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/en/events/alberto-grillo-2
CONTACT:Nathalie Ferrière:&nbsp\;nathalie.ferriere[at]sciencespo-aix.frFed
 erico Trionfetti:&nbsp\;federico.trionfetti[at]univ-amu.fr
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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