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VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//AMSE//Event Calendar//FR
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
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UID:event-8368@www.amse-aixmarseille.fr
DTSTAMP:20260430T011806Z
CREATED:20260430T011806Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260430T011806Z
STATUS:CONFIRMED
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:Economic theory seminar - Benjamin Blumenthal
DTSTART:20211007T100000Z
DTEND:20211007T110000Z
DESCRIPTION:Recent work in the political agency literature shows how being 
 less informed about policy-making can improve a representative voter's welf
 are. Using a model of targeted spending with homogeneously informed voters\
 , I show how diverse papers analysing a large range of issues in policy-mak
 ing — the role of interest groups\, the influence of media\, fiscal restr
 aints\, the effect of non-binding law\, the impact of ideology — rely on 
 the possibility of partial control\, partial screening\, or both\, when a r
 epresentative voter benefits from less information. Building on this mechan
 ism\, I subsequently ask: if voters are heterogeneously informed\, is it be
 tter to be part of a more informed elite or of the less informed masses? Ho
 w is the masses' welfare affected by the existence of a more informed elite
 ? I show that the answers depend on the elite's ability to transmit verifia
 ble information and the nature of its additional information.\\n\\nContact:
  Gaëtan Fournier: gaetan.fournier[at]univ-amu.frEvgeny Tsodikovich: evgeny
 .tsodikovich[at]univ-amu.fr\n\nPlus d'informations: https://www.amse-aixmar
 seille.fr/en/events/benjamin-blumenthal-0
LOCATION:Îlot Bernard du Bois - Salle 17\, AMU - AMSE\, 5-9 boulevard Maur
 ice Bourdet\, 13001 Marseille
URL;VALUE=URI:https://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/en/events/benjamin-blumenthal-0
CONTACT:Gaëtan Fournier: gaetan.fournier[at]univ-amu.frEvgeny Tsodikovich:
  evgeny.tsodikovich[at]univ-amu.fr
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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