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VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//AMSE//Event Calendar//FR
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
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BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:event-8973@www.amse-aixmarseille.fr
DTSTAMP:20260421T153655Z
CREATED:20260421T153655Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260421T153655Z
STATUS:CONFIRMED
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:Economic theory seminar - Clément Minaudier
DTSTART:20220317T110000Z
DTEND:20220317T120000Z
DESCRIPTION:Lobbyists often target legislators who are aligned with them ra
 ther than opponents. However\, the conditions under which interest groups p
 refer to target allies or enemies are not well understood. We investigate h
 ow time pressure affects which legislators are targeted by lobbyists. We de
 rive conditions on the cost of delaying policies and on the distribution of
  legislators' preferences for lobbyists to prefer targeting allies. We also
  show that the use of allies as intermediaries has important implications f
 or the duration of policy making and the quality of policies. Counter-intui
 tively\, an increase in the cost of delaying can increase the duration of p
 olicy making and a longer duration does not always lead to better-informed 
 policies.\\n\\nContact: Gaëtan Fournier: gaetan.fournier[at]univ-amu.frEvg
 eny Tsodikovich: evgeny.tsodikovich[at]univ-amu.fr\n\nPlus d'informations: 
 https://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/en/events/cl%C3%A9ment-minaudier-0
LOCATION:Îlot Bernard du Bois - Salle 16\, AMU - AMSE\, 5-9 boulevard Maur
 ice Bourdet\, 13001 Marseille
URL;VALUE=URI:https://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/en/events/cl%C3%A9ment-minaudier-0
CONTACT:Gaëtan Fournier: gaetan.fournier[at]univ-amu.frEvgeny Tsodikovich:
  evgeny.tsodikovich[at]univ-amu.fr
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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