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VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//AMSE//Event Calendar//FR
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
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UID:event-9393@www.amse-aixmarseille.fr
DTSTAMP:20260421T170720Z
CREATED:20260421T170720Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260421T170720Z
STATUS:CONFIRMED
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:amse seminar - James Fenske
DTSTART:20221212T103000Z
DTEND:20221212T114500Z
DESCRIPTION:Do bureaucrats’ incentives impede organizational reform? Usin
 g novel data on firms’ permit applications and internal communications fr
 om the environmental regulator in India\, we show that a delegation reform 
 that was intended to give decision-making rights to junior officers in the 
 regulatory agency over low-stakes applications was only partially implement
 ed. Low-stakes applications were more likely to be decided on by junior off
 icers after the reform\, but only at about two thirds the rate prescribed b
 y the reform. We argue that senior officers chose to retain decision rights
  over the applications that would have the worst consequences for these sen
 ior officers if handled wrongly by junior officers. In particular\, delegat
 ion was less complete for applications with the highest pollution potential
 .\\n\\nContact: Ewen Gallic: ewen.gallic[at]univ-amu.frAvner Seror: avner.s
 eror[at]univ-amu.fr\n\nPlus d'informations: https://www.amse-aixmarseille.f
 r/en/events/james-fenske-2
LOCATION:Îlot Bernard du Bois - Amphithéâtre\, AMU - AMSE\, 5-9 boulevar
 d Maurice Bourdet\, 13001 Marseille
URL;VALUE=URI:https://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/en/events/james-fenske-2
CONTACT:Ewen Gallic: ewen.gallic[at]univ-amu.frAvner Seror: avner.seror[at]
 univ-amu.fr
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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