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PRODID:-//AMSE//Event Calendar//FR
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UID:event-9944@www.amse-aixmarseille.fr
DTSTAMP:20260430T002403Z
CREATED:20260430T002403Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260430T002403Z
STATUS:CONFIRMED
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:phd seminar - Ernesto Ugolini*\, Eddy Zanoutene**
DTSTART:20230314T100000Z
DTEND:20230314T113000Z
DESCRIPTION:*A swift rise in the demand for trade protection in the US and 
 other advanced economies has paralleled a decline in world trade costs. Emp
 irical research in the US has shown that labor markets that are more expos
 ed to higher imports\, have higher unemployment\, lower wages\, and vote in
  a protectionist direction on trade bills. We first empirically show if bet
 ter market access to labor markets\, moderates the positive effect of trade
  shock on protectionism in the US. Market access describes firms’ abilit
 y to sell goods to other regions and consumers’ ability to buy goods fro
 m other regions and depends upon regional geography. To quantify the media
 ting impact of market access\, we derive a theoretical measure of market ac
 cess in a multi-country\, -region\, and -sector\, Ricardian trade model usi
 ng the methodology developed by Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016). In the count
 erfactual exercise\, we modify endogenous geography (i.e. domestic infrastr
 ucture) to see if the negative regional effect of trade shocks can be reduc
 ed\, without reducing aggregate welfare in the US.**This paper studies the 
 consequences of charitable giving for both the optimal tax system and the o
 ptimal provision of public goods. Through warm glow\, taxpayers derive util
 ity from their personal donations. Aggregate contributions then benefit to 
 all individuals through the public good effect of charitable giving. The go
 vernment has two sets of instruments to maximize social welfare: nonlinear 
 taxes or subsidies of both income and donations as well as direct contribut
 ions to the public good. Solving this joint problem\, I provide optimality 
 conditions for both tax rates and the government's contribution to the publ
 ic good.First I show that because of charitable giving\, the welfare impact
  of behavioral responses to tax policy is magnified by an externality\, due
  to the public good nature of donations\, and a spillover effect\, capturin
 g the loop between changes in individual contributions and changes in aggre
 gate contributions. Second\, I prove that the externality channel can no lo
 nger affect optimal tax rates when the government's contribution to the pub
 lic good is set optimally. Finally\, I consider a realistic tax mix that c
 ombines a nonlinear income tax with either tax credits or tax deductions fo
 r giving\, as it is the case in most OECD countries. Optimality conditions\
 , expressed in terms of empirically meaningful parameters\, are then deliv
 ered for these three tax instruments.\\n\\nContact: Camille Hainnaux: camil
 le.hainnaux[at]univ-amu.frDaniela Horta Saenz: daniela.horta-saenz[at]univ-
 amu.frJade Ponsard: jade.ponsard[at]univ-amu.frNathan Vieira: nathan.vieira
 [at]univ-amu.fr\n\nPlus d'informations: https://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/en
 /events/ernesto-ugolini-eddy-zanoutene-0
LOCATION:MEGA - Salle Carine Nourry\, 424\, Chemin du Viaduc\, 13080 Aix-en
 -Provence
URL;VALUE=URI:https://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/en/events/ernesto-ugolini-eddy-zanoutene-0
CONTACT:Camille Hainnaux: camille.hainnaux[at]univ-amu.frDaniela Horta Saen
 z: daniela.horta-saenz[at]univ-amu.frJade Ponsard: jade.ponsard[at]univ-amu
 .frNathan Vieira: nathan.vieira[at]univ-amu.fr
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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