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UID:event-9946@www.amse-aixmarseille.fr
DTSTAMP:20260430T002403Z
CREATED:20260430T002403Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260430T002403Z
STATUS:CONFIRMED
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:phd seminar - Thomas Eisfeld*\, Camille Hainnaux**
DTSTART:20230321T100000Z
DTEND:20230321T111500Z
DESCRIPTION:*This paper aims to examine the relationship between marketplac
 e design and seller competition on online platforms. Using a game-theoretic
  model\, we investigate how various design choices\, such as pricing strate
 gies\, may influence the likelihood of seller collusion and the incentives 
 of platforms to either break or sustain cartels. Our findings suggest that 
 high transaction fees may reduce competition between sellers by increasing 
 their incentives to collude\, and platforms may also have the ability to ma
 nipulate the variety of products in each category. Our theoretical framewor
 k also allows for the examination of additional design features\, such as i
 nformation disclosure and the number of products\, and their impact on sell
 er competition. Overall\, this research aims to contribute to the limited a
 cademic discussion on how the design of multi-sided markets affects competi
 tion on online platforms.**I study the optimal alternative to a carbon tax 
 using already existing taxes in the economy and its impact on inequality. I
  find that there exists an alternative first-best to the standard carbon ta
 x. Under this alternative\, the carbon tax on energy production is replaced
  by either taxes on energy consumption or taxes on inputs. Taxes on inputs 
 used in the energy sector act as a substitute to income taxes: the governme
 nt can choose between making households bear the environmental tax burden o
 r to indirectly tax the energy producer. In the latter case\, the final goo
 d sector can be partly subsidized. Studying the optimal Ramsey fiscal polic
 y\, a consumption tax is needed along the carbon tax as long as the social 
 and private gains of increasing energy consumption relatively to final good
  consumption are unequal. There also exists an alternative to carbon taxati
 on in which firms are taxed on their inputs. In this case households do not
  directly bear the tax burden\, but are indirectly impacted through income 
 taxes. If inequality is not affected by alternatives to carbon taxation in 
 a first-best setting\, this might not be the case under a Ramsey optimal po
 licy.\\n\\nContact: Camille Hainnaux: camille.hainnaux[at]univ-amu.frDaniel
 a Horta Saenz: daniela.horta-saenz[at]univ-amu.frJade Ponsard: jade.ponsard
 [at]univ-amu.frNathan Vieira: nathan.vieira[at]univ-amu.fr\n\nPlus d'inform
 ations: https://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/en/events/thomas-eisfeld-camille-h
 ainnaux-0
LOCATION:Îlot Bernard du Bois - Amphithéâtre\, AMU - AMSE\, 5-9 boulevar
 d Maurice Bourdet\, 13001 Marseille
URL;VALUE=URI:https://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/en/events/thomas-eisfeld-camille-hainnaux-0
CONTACT:Camille Hainnaux: camille.hainnaux[at]univ-amu.frDaniela Horta Saen
 z: daniela.horta-saenz[at]univ-amu.frJade Ponsard: jade.ponsard[at]univ-amu
 .frNathan Vieira: nathan.vieira[at]univ-amu.fr
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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