Nicolas Morgenroth*, Aissata Boubacar**

Séminaires internes
phd seminar

Nicolas Morgenroth*, Aissata Boubacar**

Berlin Social Science Center (WZB)*, AMSE**
Who feels precarious due to fixed-term contracts? The heterogeneous effects of fixed-term contracts on affective job insecurity across gender and household contexts*
Inter-enterprises payment deadlines and investment**
Co-écrit avec
N. Teichler, B. Schels*
Lieu

IBD Salle 16

Îlot Bernard du Bois - Salle 16

AMU - AMSE
5-9 boulevard Maurice Bourdet
13001 Marseille

Date(s)
Mardi 11 décembre 2018| 12:30 - 14:00
Contact(s)

Océane Piétri : oceane.pietri[at]univ-amu.fr
Morgan Raux : morgan.raux[at]univ-amu.fr
Laura Sénécal : laura.senecal[at]univ-amu.fr

Résumé

*In an endeavor to connect sociological and social psychological research we analyze the heterogeneous effects of fixed-term contracts on the affective job insecurity using SOEP data from Germany. Previous sociological research shows that fixed-term contracts are quite heterogeneous both in its usage and in its consequences. Recent psychological literature underlines the importance of subjective job insecurity for individual and organizational outcomes. However, the structural link between these form of objective and subjective insecurity has rarely been addressed. Using person fixed effects regression models we find a stable but modest effect of fixed-term contracts on affective job insecurity. Furthermore, our results show that women are significantly more affected than men. This difference can only rudimentarily be explained by different labor marketcharacteristics. Yet, this insecurity-gap does not not hold true for women with partner and children, pointing at prevailing traditional gender roles in the household context.

**This paper investigates the determinants of firms investment financing constraints. Using an endogenous switching regression model on Provence-Alpes Côte d'Azur firms data collected between 2005-2014, we provide a novel evidence of the role of inter-enterprises payment deadlines which are days of sales outstanding and suppliers payment terms, as factors determining firms investment financing constraints. Our findings suggest that i) inter-enterprises payment deadlines impact significantly firms investment; days of sales outstanding impact negatively firms investment while the suppliers payment terms have a positive effect on firms investment. ii) The investment of constrained firms is more sensitive to days of sales outstanding and suppliers payment terms than that of unconstrained firms.