BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//AMSE//Event Calendar//FR CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH BEGIN:VEVENT UID:event-10253@www.amse-aixmarseille.fr DTSTAMP:20260421T193748Z CREATED:20260421T193748Z LAST-MODIFIED:20260421T193748Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Development and political economy seminar - David Schonholzer DTSTART:20231110T100000Z DTEND:20231110T111500Z DESCRIPTION:Road traffic accidents in poorly regulated public transit is a leading cause of death in low- and middle-income countries. We study how pr oviding information about bus safety to passengers affects the demand and s upply of safer public transit. We collect high-frequency measures of safe d riving for five firms operating on one of the busiest long-range routes in Kenya\, using a newly developed tracking device. We randomize private infor mation to passengers about which firm is the safest choice. We then provide a public signal to both passengers and firms that buses are now being trac ked. Treated passengers do not respond to private information at first\, bu t after the introduction of the public signal they substitute strongly towa rds the safe firm\, and some firms provide safer services. We rationalize t hese effects in a model of heterogeneous firms responding strategically to higher demand for safety due to the public signal. We derive welfare estima tes of alternative equilibria\, which imply that the welfare effects of inf ormation interventions crucially depend on the nature of the market equilib rium.\\n\\nContact: Timothée Demont : timothee.demont[at]univ-amu.frHabib a Djebbari : habiba.djebbari[at]univ-amu.fr\n\nPlus d'informations: https:/ /www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/fr/evenements/david-schonholzer LOCATION:MEGA - Salle Carine Nourry\, 424\, Chemin du Viaduc\, 13080 Aix-en -Provence URL;VALUE=URI:https://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/fr/evenements/david-schonholzer CONTACT:Timothée Demont : \;timothee.demont[at]univ-amu.frHabiba Djebb ari : habiba.djebbari[at]univ-amu.fr TRANSP:OPAQUE END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR