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VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//AMSE//Event Calendar//FR
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UID:event-10333@www.amse-aixmarseille.fr
DTSTAMP:20260422T133207Z
CREATED:20260422T133207Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260422T133207Z
STATUS:CONFIRMED
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:amse seminar - Alexander Michaelides
DTSTART:20230918T093000Z
DTEND:20230918T104500Z
DESCRIPTION:Since the 1980s many countries have reformed the institutional 
 framework governing their central banks to increase operational independenc
 e. Collecting systematic biographical information\, international press cov
 erage\, and independent expert opinions\, we find that over the same period
  appointments of central bank governors have become more politically motiva
 ted\, especially after significant legislative reforms aiming to insulate c
 entral banks and their governors from political interference. We also show 
 that politically-motivated appointments reflect lower de facto independence
 \, and are associated with worse inflation and financial stability outcomes
 . Given the increase in central banks' powers worldwide\, our findings info
 rm the debate about their political accountability and credibility.\\n\\nCo
 ntact: Nicolas Clootens : nicolas.clootens[at]univ-amu.frRomain Ferrali : r
 omain.ferrali[at]univ-amu.fr\n\nPlus d'informations: https://www.amse-aixma
 rseille.fr/fr/evenements/alexander-michaelides
LOCATION:Îlot Bernard du Bois - Amphithéâtre\, AMU - AMSE\, 5-9 boulevar
 d Maurice Bourdet\, 13001 Marseille
URL;VALUE=URI:https://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/fr/evenements/alexander-michaelides
CONTACT:Nicolas Clootens : nicolas.clootens[at]univ-amu.frRomain Ferrali : 
 romain.ferrali[at]univ-amu.fr
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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