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PRODID:-//AMSE//Event Calendar//FR
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UID:event-10772@www.amse-aixmarseille.fr
DTSTAMP:20260412T004255Z
CREATED:20260412T004255Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260412T004255Z
STATUS:CONFIRMED
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:phd seminar - Sam Jackson*\, Alexandre Arnout**
DTSTART:20240409T090000Z
DTEND:20240409T103000Z
DESCRIPTION:*Cultural integration persists as one of the principal policy d
 ebates in almost all developed economies. Economics has characterised long-
 lasting cultural heterogeneity as the consequence of a preference motivated
  choice by agents\, specifically a choice by parents over the cultural heri
 tage they impart on their children. Existing models of cultural transmissio
 n have framed the process of vertical socialisation as a transfer between a
 n active agent (the parent) and a passive agent (the child). I argue that t
 his approach fails to account for the feedback effects that exist between t
 he behaviour of a child and that of their parents. Motivated by qualitative
  results from economic surveys and sociological patterns such as ’the bir
 thday party effect’\, this paper aims to examine the transmission choices
  of parents in an environment where both child and parent make active decis
 ions over their set of friendships. A better understanding of the relations
 hip between parental and child networks\, and how these might determine pre
 ferences\, attitudes and norms is a necessary step in a better understandin
 g of cultural integration as a whole. **I consider an electoral competitio
 n model\, where each candidate is associated with an exogenous initial posi
 tion from which they can strategically deviate. A deviation from the initia
 l position is called flip-flopping\, it impacts negatively citizens’ util
 ity. I introduce abstention due to alienation: citizens abstain when their 
 utility for their preferred candidate falls below a common exogenous thresh
 old (referred to as the alienation threshold). I show how the alienation th
 reshold shapes candidates’ flip-flopping strategy. When the alienation th
 reshold is high\, i.e when citizens are less inclined to vote\, there is no
  flip-flopping at equilibrium. When the alienation threshold is low\, candi
 dates flip-flop toward the center of the policy space. Surprisingly\, I sho
 w that there is a positive correlation between flip-flopping and turnout at
  equilibrium. Finally\, I study alternative models where I consider various
  objective functions for candidates. I show that electoral competition lead
 s to polarization when candidates maximize their number of votes. \\n\\nCo
 ntact: Lucie Giorgi : lucie.giorgi[at]univ-amu.frRicardo Guzman : ricardo.g
 uzman[at]univ-amu.frNatalia Labrador : natalia.labrador-bernate[at]univ-am
 u.frNathan Vieira : nathan.vieira[at]univ-amu.fr\n\nPlus d'informations: ht
 tps://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/fr/evenements/sam-jackson-alexandre-arnout
LOCATION:Îlot Bernard du Bois - Amphithéâtre\, AMU - AMSE\, 5-9 boulevar
 d Maurice Bourdet\, 13001 Marseille
URL;VALUE=URI:https://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/fr/evenements/sam-jackson-alexandre-arnout
CONTACT:Lucie Giorgi : lucie.giorgi[at]univ-amu.frRicardo Guzman : ricardo.
 guzman[at]univ-amu.frNatalia Labrador :&nbsp\;natalia.labrador-bernate[at]u
 niv-amu.frNathan Vieira : nathan.vieira[at]univ-amu.fr
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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