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UID:event-11017@www.amse-aixmarseille.fr
DTSTAMP:20260421T230546Z
CREATED:20260421T230546Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260421T230546Z
STATUS:CONFIRMED
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:Economic theory seminar - Sudipta Sarangi
DTSTART:20240315T110000Z
DTEND:20240315T120000Z
DESCRIPTION:We consider an incomplete information network game in which age
 nts are only aware of the identity of their immediate neighbors. They form
  beliefs about the links of their neighbors (the rest of the network) and p
 lay a linear-quadratic effort game to maximize interim payoffs. We establis
 h the existence and uniqueness of Bayesian-Nash equilibria in pure strategi
 es. In equilibrium\, agents use local knowledge of their direct connections
  to make inferences about the complementarity strength of their actions wit
 h other agents given by their updated beliefs regarding their walks in the 
 network. Using this and an example we show that under incomplete informatio
 n\, besides network architecture\, agent identity plays a crucial role in d
 etermining strategic behavior. We also characterize equilibrium behavior un
 der different forms of ex-ante prior beliefs like uniform priors\, Erdos-Re
 nyi network generation\, and homophilic linkage. Not surprisingly\, uniform
  priors provide similar results similar to degree-based models of incomplet
 e information.\\n\\nContact: Gaëtan Fournier : gaetan.fournier[at]univ-amu
 .fr\n\nPlus d'informations: https://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/fr/evenements/
 sudipta-sarangi
LOCATION:Îlot Bernard du Bois - Salle 16\, AMU - AMSE\, 5-9 boulevard Maur
 ice Bourdet\, 13001 Marseille
URL;VALUE=URI:https://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/fr/evenements/sudipta-sarangi
CONTACT:Gaëtan Fournier : gaetan.fournier[at]univ-amu.fr
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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