BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//AMSE//Event Calendar//FR
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:event-11344@www.amse-aixmarseille.fr
DTSTAMP:20260422T205043Z
CREATED:20260422T205043Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260422T205043Z
STATUS:CONFIRMED
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:phd seminar - Guillaume Bataille*\, Santiago Lopez**
DTSTART:20241112T100000Z
DTEND:20241112T113000Z
DESCRIPTION:*Motivated by recent examples\, this study addresses the instab
 ility of International Fishery Agreements (IFAs) through a dynamic multista
 ge optimal control model involving two heterogeneous countries exploiting s
 hared fishery resources. We explore the transition from cooperation to comp
 etition\, driven by differing time preferences and the adoption of Markovia
 n strategies post-withdrawal. Our results demonstrate that coalitions of he
 terogeneous players inevitably dissolve over time\, regardless of the shari
 ng rule. By applying the dynamic Shapley Value\, we decompose the coalition
 ’s aggregate worth\, mitigating the incentive to exit. Furthermore\, we f
 ind that a fishing moratorium policy can expedite the recovery of near-exti
 nct fish stocks\, with fishing resuming under cooperative management once s
 ustainable levels are reached.**This paper explores how morality influences
  political support for public policies by comparing outcomes in societies o
 f conventional (self-interested) agents and those of Kantian agents. Our mo
 del features two public policies—a redistributive lump-sum transfer and a
  public good—with agents voting on both the tax rate that funds these pol
 icies and the distribution of the public budget between them. After the vot
 ing process\, agents decide on their labor supply\, and following taxes and
  transfers\, they may choose to make voluntary contributions to the public 
 good. The model incorporates morality through the Kantian categorical imper
 ative\, prompting agents to universalize the morally equivalent contributio
 ns of others when determining their own voluntary contributions. Using a pr
 obabilistic voting framework that aligns with utilitarian welfare maximizat
 ion\, we show that Kantian societies support lower tax rates and allocate a
  smaller share of the budget to the public good compared to societies with 
 purely self-interested agents. This moral constraint on policy support lea
 ds to increased inequality in private consumption and consistently lower ut
 ility levels for all agents\, with the most significant adverse effects on 
 individuals with lower productivity. These findings reveal the complex tra
 de-offs between morality and social welfare\, highlighting the limitations 
 of Kantian ethics in achieving distributive justice within democratic polic
 y-making.\\n\\nContact: Philippine Escudié : philippine.escudie[at]univ-a
 mu.frLucie Giorgi : lucie.giorgi[at]univ-amu.frKla Kouadio : kla.kouadio[at
 ]univ-amu.frLola Soubeyrand : lola.soubeyrand[at]univ-amu.fr\n\nPlus d'inf
 ormations: https://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/fr/evenements/guillaume-bataill
 e-santiago-lopez
LOCATION:MEGA - Salle Carine Nourry\, 424\, Chemin du Viaduc\, 13080 Aix-en
 -Provence
URL;VALUE=URI:https://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/fr/evenements/guillaume-bataille-santiago-lopez
CONTACT:Philippine Escudié :&nbsp\;philippine.escudie[at]univ-amu.frLucie 
 Giorgi : lucie.giorgi[at]univ-amu.frKla Kouadio : kla.kouadio[at]univ-amu.f
 rLola Soubeyrand :&nbsp\;lola.soubeyrand[at]univ-amu.fr
TRANSP:OPAQUE
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR