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VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//AMSE//Event Calendar//FR
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
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UID:event-11755@www.amse-aixmarseille.fr
DTSTAMP:20260414T110928Z
CREATED:20260414T110928Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260414T110928Z
STATUS:CONFIRMED
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:amse seminar - Simon Finster
DTSTART:20250113T103000Z
DTEND:20250113T114500Z
DESCRIPTION:We initiate the study of how auction design affects the divisio
 n of surplus among buyers. We propose a parsimonious measure for equity and
  apply it to the family of standard auctions for homogeneous goods. Our sur
 plus-equitable mechanism is efficient\, Bayesian-Nash incentive compatible\
 , and achieves surplus parity among winners ex-post. The uniform-price auct
 ion is equity-optimal if and only if buyers have a pure common value. Again
 st intuition\, the pay-as-bid auction is not always preferred in terms of e
 quity if buyers have pure private values. In auctions with price mixing bet
 ween pay-as-bid and uniform prices\, we provide prior-free bounds on the eq
 uity-preferred pricing rule under a common regularity condition on signals.
 \\n\\nContact: Nicolas Clootens : nicolas.clootens[at]univ-amu.frRomain Fer
 rali : romain.ferrali[at]univ-amu.frAgnes Tomini : agnes.tomini[at]univ-am
 u.frFederico Trionfetti : federico.trionfetti[at]univ-amu.fr\n\nPlus d'inf
 ormations: https://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/fr/evenements/simon-finster
LOCATION:Îlot Bernard du Bois - Amphithéâtre\, AMU - AMSE\, 5-9 boulevar
 d Maurice Bourdet\, 13001 Marseille
URL;VALUE=URI:https://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/fr/evenements/simon-finster
CONTACT:Nicolas Clootens : nicolas.clootens[at]univ-amu.frRomain Ferrali : 
 romain.ferrali[at]univ-amu.frAgnes Tomini :&nbsp\;agnes.tomini[at]univ-amu.
 frFederico Trionfetti :&nbsp\;federico.trionfetti[at]univ-amu.fr
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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