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VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//AMSE//Event Calendar//FR
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
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UID:event-12738@www.amse-aixmarseille.fr
DTSTAMP:20260414T224028Z
CREATED:20260414T224028Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260414T224028Z
STATUS:CONFIRMED
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:amse seminar - François Salanié
DTSTART:20260302T103000Z
DTEND:20260302T114500Z
DESCRIPTION:In the canonical partial equilibrium setting\, firms with arbit
 rary cost functions sell an homogenous good to the demand side. Consider an
  allocation for which all trades take place at the same price\, and balance
  demand exactly. This allocation is said to be robust to undercutting if a 
 firm cannot increase profits by undercutting its competitors. We fully char
 acterize the set of these allocations. This set includes the set of competi
 tive equilibria\, but it may also include other allocations with higher pri
 ces\, for which the First Welfare Theorem fails. We also show that the set 
 of these allocations coincides with the set of equilibrium outcomes of a si
 mple competitive game in which firms compete in limit orders. Hence\, these
  allocations have a strategic foundation with non-negligible firms\, in con
 trast to competitive allocations.\\n\\nContact: Ségal Le Guern Herry : se
 gal.le-guern-herry[at]univ-amu.frMorgan Raux : morgan.raux[at]univ-amu.fr\
 n\nPlus d'informations: https://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/fr/evenements/fran
 %C3%A7ois-salani%C3%A9
LOCATION:Îlot Bernard du Bois - Amphithéâtre\, AMU - AMSE\, 5-9 boulevar
 d Maurice Bourdet\, 13001 Marseille
URL;VALUE=URI:https://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/fr/evenements/fran%C3%A7ois-salani%C3%A9
CONTACT:Ségal Le Guern Herry :&nbsp\;segal.le-guern-herry[at]univ-amu.frMo
 rgan Raux :&nbsp\;morgan.raux[at]univ-amu.fr
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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