BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//AMSE//Event Calendar//FR CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH BEGIN:VEVENT UID:event-7350@www.amse-aixmarseille.fr DTSTAMP:20260416T182504Z CREATED:20260416T182504Z LAST-MODIFIED:20260416T182504Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Development and political economy seminar - Anne Karing DTSTART:20210521T100000Z DTEND:20210521T111500Z DESCRIPTION:Differently to financial or material incentives\, the strength of reputational incentives depends on the equilibrium level of contribution s (Bénabou and Tirole\, 2012). We test this prediction empirically in the context of a new deworming program that offers free treatment to 200\,000 a dults in Kenya. We randomize the introduction of two types of social signal s in the form of colorful bracelets and ink applied to the thumb. The brace lets and ink allow adults to signal that they contributed to protecting the ir community from worms. Further\, we exogenously vary the cost of dewormin g by assigning communities to different travel distances to treatment locat ions. Reduced form estimates show that (1) bracelets as signals significant ly increase de worming take-up\, outperforming a material incentive\; (2) t here is no detectable effect for the ink signal\; (4) adults are highly sen sitive to distance and both signaling treatments have a larger impact on ta ke-up at far distances. We build a structural model that mirrors the theore tical framework provided by Bénabou and Tirole (2012) and explicitly model latent variables such as the private benefit of incentives\, the visibilit y of the signals and the reputational returns to signaling. The model allow s us to estimate counterfactuals in response to manipulations imfeasible to conduct in the experimental setting and investigate how aggregate shifts i n the cost of deworming change the returns to signaling. Consistent with th e theoretical predictions\, we find that reputational returns increase at l ower equilibrium take-up levels\, and that the increase in reputational ret urns mitigates the negative impact of cost on treatment take-up. Of substan tive policy importance\, as individuals' willingness to walk increases at f urther walking distances\, deworming treatment locations can be set up furt her apart and with the same number of locations larger geographic areas can be covered.\\n\\nContact: Timothée Demont : timothee.demont[at]univ-amu. frEva Raiber : eva.raiber[at]univ-amu.fr\n\nPlus d'informations: https://w ww.amse-aixmarseille.fr/fr/evenements/anne-karing LOCATION:MEGA URL;VALUE=URI:https://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/fr/evenements/anne-karing CONTACT:Timothée Demont : \;timothee.demont[at]univ-amu.frEva Raiber :  \;eva.raiber[at]univ-amu.fr TRANSP:OPAQUE END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR