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PRODID:-//AMSE//Event Calendar//FR
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UID:event-7766@www.amse-aixmarseille.fr
DTSTAMP:20260728T181353Z
CREATED:20260728T181353Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260728T181353Z
STATUS:CONFIRMED
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:job market seminar - Romain Ferrali
DTSTART:20210115T103000Z
DTEND:20210115T114500Z
DESCRIPTION:Under which conditions do anti-corruption policies effectively
  reduce bureau-cratic corruption? Previous studies find that anti-corrupti
 on audits are effective in disciplining politicians\, but their impact on 
 bureaucrats is unclear. We leverage 10 years of randomized audits and the c
 areers of 275 thousand Brazilian municipal of-ficials. We find that even 
 when strong evidence of corruption is found\, audits do not have observable
  implications for bureaucratic careers\, such as dismissals or depar-tures.
  To investigate whether audits trigger unobservable reductions in corruptio
 n or have long-term disciplining effects\, we propose a model of corruptio
 n with career concerns that we estimate structurally. We rule out that audi
 ts have unobservable reductions in corruption\, and our results are consist
 ent with either large disciplin-ing effects\, or limited effectiveness. W
 e identify strong complementarities among the program’s components\, sugg
 esting that multi-pronged approaches combining increases in the frequency o
 f audits with tougher sanctions are most effective at reducing corruption.
 \n\nPlus d'informations: https://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/fr/evenements/rom
 ain-ferrali
URL;VALUE=URI:https://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/fr/evenements/romain-ferrali
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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