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DTSTAMP:20260501T095953Z
CREATED:20260501T095953Z
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SUMMARY:phd seminar - Nandeeta Neerunjun*\, Pavel Molchanov**
DTSTART:20210601T090000Z
DTEND:20210601T101500Z
DESCRIPTION:*I analyze environmental policies that account for emissions da
 mage due to fossil-fuel elec- tricity production and that foster investment
  in intermittent renewable capacities. I start with a setting of consumers 
 on flat-rate tariff who cannot adapt their demand to inter- mittent electri
 city supply. I therefore define a constraint social welfare and study its d
 ecentralization in a competitive market with a Pigouvian tax. I find that t
 he tax does not implement the first-best constraint allocations. With flexi
 ble consumers on state- contingent tariffs\, I also find that the first-bes
 t allocations are unreachable with the tax. Similar observations are made i
 n both settings of consumers if tradable emissions permits are implemented.
  Due to intermittency of renewables\, I propose that these emissions pric- 
 ing instruments be complemented with direct subsidies for renewables-based 
 technologies such as the feed-in tariff. I am then closer to a second-best 
 solution.**What is the link between market competition and the equilibrium 
 level of unemployment? This paper augments the standard Dixit-Stiglitz (197
 7) model with labor matching frictions and non-CES preferences. It connects
  the two well-known market distortions: the allocational distortion (too ma
 ny firms producing too little) and the labor market distortion (firms posti
 ng too few vacancies). The first result describes efficiency in the labor m
 arket. I show that the unemployment level generated in the market equilibri
 um under monopolistic competition is always inefficiently high. Namely\, th
 e under-employment arises due to incomplete appropriability distortion\, i.
 e. the fact that each firm internalizes only a fraction of the consumer sur
 plus in its revenue. Second\, I show that VES modeling is crucial to explai
 n why increased competition in the product market can have a positive effec
 t on the employment level. Only under CES preferences\, the two markets are
  completely separable. The third result of the paper discusses the economic
  trade-off between product market efficiency and employment level. While co
 rrection of excessive firm entry by the means of licensing costs is an effi
 ciency-enhancing policy on the product market\, it is detrimental for emplo
 yment on the labor market. Calibration of the model for the US economy show
 s that the predicted drop in employment due to the correction of Dixit-Stig
 litz distortion is large enough to completely offset any benefits of such p
 olicy on the product market and to reduce the overall welfare.\\n\\nContact
 : Anushka Chawla : anushka.chawla[at]univ-amu.frKenza Elass : kenza.elass[a
 t]univ-amu.frCarolina Ulloa Suarez : carolina.ulloa-suarez[at]univ-amu.fr\n
 \nPlus d'informations: https://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/fr/evenements/nande
 eta-neerunjun-pavel-molchanov
URL;VALUE=URI:https://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/fr/evenements/nandeeta-neerunjun-pavel-molchanov
CONTACT:Anushka Chawla : anushka.chawla[at]univ-amu.frKenza Elass : kenza.e
 lass[at]univ-amu.frCarolina Ulloa Suarez : carolina.ulloa-suarez[at]univ-am
 u.fr
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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