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UID:event-8682@www.amse-aixmarseille.fr
DTSTAMP:20260429T080748Z
CREATED:20260429T080748Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260429T080748Z
STATUS:CONFIRMED
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:phd seminar - Fabien Petit*\, Yuanzhe Tang**
DTSTART:20211207T100000Z
DTEND:20211207T113000Z
DESCRIPTION:*Values capture what is important to an individual and can shap
 e economic behaviors through attitudes and preferences. Yet\, no attention 
 has been paid to the fact that individuals hold a variety of values and tha
 t there may be costs when these are not consistent with each other. This pa
 per examines how individuals reconcile their values\, both over time and ac
 ross different categories\, when values are inter-dependent. I develop a mo
 del in which individuals adjust their values simultaneously when an experie
 nce occurs in their life\, thus leading to spillover effects across values.
  Bringing the model to cohort data\, I assess the impact of several life ev
 ents---parenthood\, sickness and unemployment---on values. The empirical re
 sults suggest that (i) values change over the lifecycle due to life events\
 , (ii) values are linked to each other\, and (iii) spillover effects do exi
 st and are sizeable.**The ongoing US-China trade war suggests that there ex
 ist some shortcomings of the WTO agreements which are mainly instrument-bas
 ed. The import commitments made by China in the Phase One Deal have a flavo
 r of an outcome-based agreement. In this paper\, I revisit the instrumentba
 sed trade agreement model of Horn\, Maggi\, and Staiger (2006)\, where cont
 ract incompleteness means that the optimal agreement may not lead to the fi
 rst-best outcome. I extend the model to introduce an outcome-based agreemen
 t\, namely import volume constraint. When governments face uncertainty abou
 t the state of the economy\, I first show that state-contingent outcome-bas
 ed agreements can replicate first-best instrument-based agreements if their
  contracting costs are the same. I second show that a non-contingent outcom
 e-based agreement deals well with terms-of-trade manipulation and provides 
 some flexibility to react to that uncertainty at the same time. Whether a n
 on-contingent outcome-based contract is the optimal agreement jointly depen
 ds on government’s ability to manipulate terms of trade\, the size and so
 urce of state uncertainty and its contracting cost.\\n\\nContact: Kenza Ela
 ss : kenza.elass[at]univ-amu.frCamille Hainnaux : camille.hainnaux[at]univ-
 amu.frDaniela Horta Saenz : daniela.horta-saenz[at]univ-amu.frJade Ponsard 
 : jade.ponsard[at]univ-amu.fr\n\nPlus d'informations: https://www.amse-aixm
 arseille.fr/fr/evenements/fabien-petit-yuanzhe-tang
LOCATION:MEGA - Salle Carine Nourry\, 424\, Chemin du Viaduc\, 13080 Aix-en
 -Provence
URL;VALUE=URI:https://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/fr/evenements/fabien-petit-yuanzhe-tang
CONTACT:Kenza Elass : kenza.elass[at]univ-amu.frCamille Hainnaux : camille.
 hainnaux[at]univ-amu.frDaniela Horta Saenz : daniela.horta-saenz[at]univ-am
 u.frJade Ponsard : jade.ponsard[at]univ-amu.fr
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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