BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//AMSE//Event Calendar//FR
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:event-8709@www.amse-aixmarseille.fr
DTSTAMP:20260530T162120Z
CREATED:20260530T162120Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260530T162120Z
STATUS:CONFIRMED
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:phd seminar - Dallal Bendjellal
DTSTART:20211214T104500Z
DTEND:20211214T113000Z
DESCRIPTION:I study the problem of optimal public debt maturity in an econo
 my in which the government cannot issue state-contingent debt and public de
 bt serves as collateral for private agents. When private agents are not fin
 ancially constrained\, the government is able to fully insulate the economy
  against public spending shocks by issuing long term bonds and investing sh
 ort term. This is because the market value of outstanding long-term debt de
 creases when public spending and thus interest rates rise. I find that this
  conclusion is not robust to the introduction of a collateral friction. Whe
 n private agents use government debt as collateral for their liquidity need
 s\, the government finds it optimal to issue short-term bonds along with lo
 ng-term debt. While long-term debt provides a hedging benefit against shock
 s\, short-term debt eases the financial constraint as the value of long-ter
 m debt in the collateral declines.\\n\\nContact: Kenza Elass : kenza.elass[
 at]univ-amu.frCamille Hainnaux : camille.hainnaux[at]univ-amu.frDaniela Hor
 ta Saenz : daniela.horta-saenz[at]univ-amu.frJade Ponsard : jade.ponsard[at
 ]univ-amu.fr\n\nPlus d'informations: https://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/fr/ev
 enements/dallal-bendjellal-3
LOCATION:Îlot Bernard du Bois - Salle 21\, AMU - AMSE\, 5-9 boulevard Maur
 ice Bourdet\, 13001 Marseille
URL;VALUE=URI:https://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/fr/evenements/dallal-bendjellal-3
CONTACT:Kenza Elass : kenza.elass[at]univ-amu.frCamille Hainnaux : camille.
 hainnaux[at]univ-amu.frDaniela Horta Saenz : daniela.horta-saenz[at]univ-am
 u.frJade Ponsard : jade.ponsard[at]univ-amu.fr
TRANSP:OPAQUE
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR