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VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//AMSE//Event Calendar//FR
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
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UID:event-9594@www.amse-aixmarseille.fr
DTSTAMP:20260422T141916Z
CREATED:20260422T141916Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260422T141916Z
STATUS:CONFIRMED
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:amse seminar - Bertrand Garbinti
DTSTART:20221205T103000Z
DTEND:20221205T114500Z
DESCRIPTION:We study a reform of the French wealth tax that dramatically re
 duced the amount of information that taxpayers must self-report below a ce
 rtain level of wealth. Combining administrative micro-data with dynamic bu
 nching and difference-in-differences  approaches\, we find large behavio
 ral responses to this switch to a low-information regime. The reform caused
  a 0.5 percentage points average decrease in the annual growth rate of wea
 lth reported by treated taxpayers each year following the switch to the lo
 w-information regime. This reduction is driven by a 4 percentage points de
 crease for taxpayers bunching at the information discontinuity threshold
 . Consistent with opacity leading to lower compliance\, treated households 
 do not experience a real change in their (third-party) reported labor and 
 capital income. The wealth tax base becomes much more elastic in the low-i
 nformation regime\, illustrating the first-order role of information polic
 y choices for tax base elasticities.\\n\\nContact: Ewen Gallic : ewen.gall
 ic[at]univ-amu.frAvner Seror : avner.seror[at]univ-amu.fr\n\nPlus d'informa
 tions: https://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/fr/evenements/bertrand-garbinti
LOCATION:Îlot Bernard du Bois - Amphithéâtre\, AMU - AMSE\, 5-9 boulevar
 d Maurice Bourdet\, 13001 Marseille
URL;VALUE=URI:https://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/fr/evenements/bertrand-garbinti
CONTACT:Ewen Gallic : ewen.gallic[at]univ-amu.frAvner Seror : avner.seror[a
 t]univ-amu.fr
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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