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PRODID:-//AMSE//Event Calendar//FR
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UID:event-9915@www.amse-aixmarseille.fr
DTSTAMP:20260429T204309Z
CREATED:20260429T204309Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260429T204309Z
STATUS:CONFIRMED
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:Economic theory seminar - Vessela Daskalova
DTSTART:20230316T110000Z
DTEND:20230316T120000Z
DESCRIPTION:This paper presents a model of ingroup favouritism in collectiv
 e decisions. The focus is on the role of the institutional set-up for wheth
 er individuals' discriminatory preferences are mitigated or exacerbated. Wh
 en are collective decisions less biased than individual decisions? Do diver
 se committees discriminate less than homogeneous ones? I consider the inter
 action between committee composition (homogeneous or diverse) and decision 
 rule (unanimity or majority). The analysis suggests that homogeneous commit
 tees can be expected to discriminate more than individual decision makers b
 oth under unanimity rule and under majority rule\, but the reasons are diff
 erent under the two rules. Diversity in committees may help mitigate or avo
 id own group favouritism and can be expected to lead to less discrimination
  than decisions by homogeneous committees or by an individual decision make
 r.\\n\\nContact: Gaëtan Fournier : gaetan.fournier[at]univ-amu.fr\n\nPlus 
 d'informations: https://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/fr/evenements/vessela-dask
 alova
LOCATION:Îlot Bernard du Bois - Salle 16\, AMU - AMSE\, 5-9 boulevard Maur
 ice Bourdet\, 13001 Marseille
URL;VALUE=URI:https://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/fr/evenements/vessela-daskalova
CONTACT:Gaëtan Fournier : gaetan.fournier[at]univ-amu.fr
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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