Publications
The relationship between entry-regulation, corruption, and entrepreneurship is controversial in the literature. Using a broad cross-country dataset to deepen the investigation, this paper distinguishes opportunity and necessity-motivated entrepreneurship in different development contexts. Corruption might grease the wheels of ineffective administrative machinery in developing countries with heavy entry-regulation. Yet, the marginal effect of corruption will generally be non-significant in other developing countries and in developed countries. Moreover, our results suggest that corruption deters opportunity-motivated entrepreneurship—the type of entrepreneurship that may contribute the most to productivity, economic growth, and development—in developed countries.
We rationalize the observed short-run differences in corporate and long-term government bond yields in an financial-accelerator model with frictions that restrict changes in portfolio shares. We estimate the model on quarterly data for the Euro Area from 1999 to 2019, and show that the portfolio friction parameter is positive and significant. Portfolio frictions not only generate a time-varying wedge between the two returns that fits the data, but also raise the volatility of return differentials, and the precautionary motive of savers. As a result, the macroeconomic effects of uncertainty shocks are amplified by portfolio frictions.
We study a class of location games where players want to attract as many resources as possible and pay a cost when deviating from an exogenous reference location. This class of games includes political competitions between policy-interested parties and firms' costly horizontal differentiation. We find that the introduction of reference locations simplifies the set of pure-strategy equilibrium to a unique candidate which has a strong property: at most four players, the two most-left and two most-right, deviate from their reference locations. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the candidate to be an equilibrium. We illustrate our results in particular cases including the duopoly competition where we moderate the principle of minimal differentiation.
A common practice in many auctions is to offer bidders an opportunity to improve their bids, known as a best and final offer stage. This improved bid can depend on new information either about the asset or about the competitors. This paper examines the effects of new information regarding competitors, seeking to determine what information the auctioneer should provide assuming the set of allowable bids is discrete. The rational strategy profile that maximizes the revenue of the auctioneer is the one where each bidder makes the highest possible bid that is lower than his valuation of the item. This strategy profile is an equilibrium for a large enough number of bidders, regardless of the information released. We compare the number of bidders needed for this profile to be an equilibrium under different information structures. We find that it becomes an equilibrium with fewer bidders when less additional information is made available to the bidders regarding the competition. It follows that when the number of bidders is a priori unknown, there are some advantages to the auctioneer not revealing information and conducting a one-stage auction instead.
Based on a unique database (data on 2529 bank-firm relationships of 403 firms from 2012 to 2018) provided by the Central Bank of Tunisia, this article analyses the impact of the intensity and duration of bank-firm relationship on loan quality. By estimating a panel ordered probit model, the results show that the intensity of the lending relationship has a positive (negative) impact on high (medium or low) quality loans. In addition, the duration of the bank-firm relationship increases the probability of low-quality loans. We also find that the impact of relationship lending on loan quality differs according to the level of profitability of the firm. Low and non-performing firms tend to have longer and closer bank relationship, whereas it is the opposite for performing firms. Our results suggest that in an emerging market concentrated around a few banks, longer and closer banking relationships are mainly in favour of low and non-performing firms, reflecting adverse selection and strong moral hazard.
Household surveys do not capture incomes at the top of the distribution well. This yields biased inequality measures. We compare the performance of the reweighting and replacing methods to address top incomes underreporting in surveys using information from tax records. The biggest challenge is that the true threshold above which underreporting occurs is unknown. Relying on simulation, we construct a hypothetical true distribution and a “distorted” distribution that mimics an underreporting pattern found in a novel linked data for Uruguay. Our simulations show that if one chooses a threshold that is not close to the true one, corrected inequality measures may be significantly biased. Interestingly, the bias using the replacing method is less sensitive to the choice of threshold. We approach the threshold selection challenge in practice using the Uruguayan linked data. Our findings are analogous to the simulation exercise. These results, however, should not be considered a general assessment of the two methods.
The increase in employment polarization observed in several high-income economies has coincided with a reduction in inter-generational mobility. This paper argues that the disappearance of middling jobs can drive changes in mobility, notably by removing a stepping stone towards high-paying occupations for those from less well-off family backgrounds. Using data from two British cohorts who entered the labour market at two points in time with very different degrees of employment polarization, we examine how parental income affects both entry occupations and occupational upgrading over careers. We find that transitions across occupations are key to mobility and that the impact of parental income has grown over time. At regional level, using a shift-share IV-strategy, we show that the impact of parental income has increased the most in regions experiencing the greatest increase in polarisation. This indicates that the disappearance of middling jobs played a role in the observed decline in mobility.
This paper studies differences across genders in the re-contesting decisions of politicians following electoral wins or defeats. Using close races in mixed-gender French local elections, we show that women are less likely to persist in competition when they lose compared to male runners-up, but are equally or more prone than male winners to re-contest when they win. Differences in observable characteristics or in the expected electoral returns of running again cannot fully account for these gender gaps in persistence. In contrast, evidence suggests that results are driven by behavioural explanations such as cross-gender differences in candidates’ attitudes toward competition, or by political parties behaving differently toward female and male candidates for a given electoral outcome. Additionally, we provide evidence that a woman’s victory encourages former female challengers to re-contest but does not trigger the entry of new female candidates.
We examine the links between age, risk tolerance, and impatience in a large French representative sample. We combine elicited preferences data based on an incentivized web experiment and stated preferences data based on self-reported surveys. Our findings highlight distinct patterns: when considering stated preferences, both risk tolerance and impatience exhibit a decline with age. Higher risk tolerance is associated with higher impatience, and this relationship strengthens with age in the financial domain. In contrast, our analysis of elicited measures uncovers a different dynamic. Specifically, risk tolerance tends to increase with age, while age exhibits no significant influence on impatience. Furthermore, individuals endowed with higher risk tolerance tend to demonstrate lower levels of impatience, irrespective of their age.
