

## Colloque de lancement du Réseau International de Recherche « Justice et intérêt » / « Justice and Interest » International Research Network Kick Off Meeting - 19-20 Sept., 2019

Lieu : Aix-Marseille Université - AMSE, 5 boulevard Bourdet, 13001 Marseille > Salle de réunion 2-32 (2<sup>e</sup> étage)

**19 septembre**

- 10.00 Accueil café  
> Hall d'accueil (rez-de-chaussée)
- 10.15-11.00 Introduction - présentation des buts et activités généraux dans le programme IRN  
**Gilles Campagnolo**, coordinateur du réseau IRN - PI of the International Research Network et co-coordonateur de l'équipe AMSE de l'IRN - RTC of IRN avec **Miriam Teschl**, co-coordinatrice de l'équipe AMSE de l'IRN
- 11.00-13.00 Session 1  
**Claude d'Aspremont**, Université Catholique de Louvain, CORE (Belgique)  
*Rawls and the notion of fundamental preferences (1)*  
**Feriel Kandil**, AMSE (France)  
*Ricoeur, Rawls and the aporia of the just (2)*
- 13.00 Déjeuner  
> Hall d'accueil (rez-de-chaussée)
- 14.30-15.30 Session 2  
**Emrah Aydinonat**, University of Helsinki, TINT (Finlande)  
*Multiple model idealization in economics (3)*
- 15.30 Pause-café  
> Hall d'accueil (rez-de-chaussée)
- 16.00-17.30 **Table ronde « Justice et intérêt »**  
L'information sur le programme IRN de l'INSHS sera donnée à cette occasion
- 20.00 Dîner de gala  
Restaurant « La Nautique » - pavillon Flottant de la SNM, 20 Quai de Rive Neuve, 13007 Marseille

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**20 septembre**

- 9.30            Accueil café  
                 > Hall d'accueil (rez-de-chaussée)
- 10.00-12.00    Session 3
- Philippe van Basshuysen**, CPNSS, London School of Economics (Angleterre)  
                 *Design economics: Past and future (4)*
- Laurent Jaffro**, PHARE, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (France)  
                 *Fairness, Impartiality, and Bargaining: Varieties of Moral Contractualism (5)*
- 12.30            Déjeuner  
                 > Hall d'accueil (rez-de-chaussée)
- 14.00-15.00    Session 4
- Michele Bee**, CWP, Université de Lausanne (Suisse)  
                 *Adam Smith's Third Concept of Justice (6)*
- 15.00            Pause-café  
                 > Hall d'accueil (rez-de-chaussée)
- 15.30-16.30    **Table ronde**  
                 Projets de mobilité et publications cosignées envisagées avec les partenaires du programme
- 20.00            Dîner  
                 Restaurant « La Manne » - 18 Boulevard de la Liberté, 13001 Marseille

## Résumés des présentations :

- (1) We argue that Rawls does not reject the notion of fundamental preferences. But these fundamental preferences should be very specific, restricted to a limited number of goods.
- (2) The presentation conducts a comparative study between Ricoeur's and Rawls' thought on justice. Whereas Ricoeur focuses on the dialectic between the just and the good, Rawls is concerned with the ideal conditions under which a universal consensus on the principles of justice may be reached. Ricoeur gives much importance to reading Rawls. He offers many commentaries, especially on Rawls's major contribution, A Theory of Justice. This chapter focuses on such comments and on the relating paradoxical interpretation of Rawls's approach to justice Ricoeur provides. First, this chapter suggests that, with his interpretation of Rawls's major contribution, Ricoeur contributes to put the light on the conflicts between the just and the good. These conflicts are the key elements of what may be referred to as the aporia of the just, which consists in the contradictory requirements coming from the just considered as a virtue of either institutions or individuals. Second, this chapter shows that whereas the aporia is a major problem in Rawls' approach to justice, it is at the core of the dialectic dynamic Ricoeur sees within moral life. In his work, the aporia leads to what we call the three paradoxes of justice, which are the paradoxes with legal, distributive and political justice. Considering such paradoxes, Ricoeur takes the ethics of practical wisdom as a necessary recourse. The latter provides fair decision makers with the resources needed for the aporia to be, if not resolved, at least eased.
- (3) In this talk, I highlight the importance of the use of multiple models in economics and explore the various ways in which the use of multiple highly idealised models could be justified. I argue that to get a better grasp of why economists use multiple idealised models, one needs to look at these models within their appropriate historical context, which commonly includes a cluster of relevant models, explanations and arguments in economics. Although, philosophers of economics have long tried to make sense of the use of unrealistic economic models, they mostly focused on the relation between a model and its intended target. Zooming out from this one-model-one-target view will help us see the contribution, or the value added of individual models better.
- (4) Design economics seeks to create or transform institutions in ways that bring about desirable social outcomes. I review the history of this research programme and I venture a guess about its future. Two paradigms within design economics are identified: large-scale design of economic systems, prevalent in particular in the early days of mechanism design (e.g. Hurwicz, 1972); and later economic engineering (e.g. Roth, 2002). It is shown that, while the contributions of the former were predominantly theoretical and led to few if any real-world reforms, the latter has come to assist policy-making, but this practical advantage came at the cost of losing touch with debates about economic systems. I argue that economic engineering is a precondition for successful large-scale design. Recent progress in engineering suggests that large-scale design might resurrect in a form that will allow reformers to rely on it.
- (5) Some authors, notably Scanlon, argue that some version of Kantian contractualism can account for the basis of morality, on the ground that justification before others is at the very core of moral life, and that contractualism is the right method of justification. Research on the question of the application of contractualism in moral philosophy has often focused on the comparison between Hobbesian approaches, through bargaining in a non-cooperative state of nature, and Kantian approaches that require ideal, counterfactual conditions of agreement. But comparing different versions of Kantian contractualism is also instructive. Examining some of the objections that have been raised against Rawls is crucial to understanding the issues at stake in the discussion. The main purpose of the presentation is to assess and compare in some aspects Rawls' Kantian constructivism and Scanlon's moral contractualism.
- (6) Two kinds of justice are usually noticed in Smith's thought: commutative and distributive justice. The first consists in abstaining from hurting others, the second in proper beneficence. In the former case it is a matter of not robbing, in the latter of making presents. However, in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith envisages also a third often overlooked sense of justice, which according to him comprehends and is more extensive than either of the former. It deals with the right appreciation of something's worth. Exchange in the Wealth of Nations can be explained by this third sense of justice and not by commutative justice alone, as usually stated.