Ernesto Ugolini

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Current Position

Ph.D. in Economics
Aix-Marseille School of Economics, Mareille, France   *2021 - present*
- Advisors: Renaud Bourlès (AMSE, Central Marseille) and Lorenzo Rotunno (IMF, AMSE)

Visiting Student
Bocconi University, Milan, Italy   *Spring 2024*
- Sponsors: Italo Colantone and Gianmarco Ottaviano

Temporary Lecturer
Faculty of Economics and Management, Aix-Marseille University, Marseille, France   *2021 - present*
- Micro III: General equilibrium Theory

Co-founder and co-organizer - AMSE Trade Reading Group
Aix-Marseille School of Economics, Marseille, France   *2021 - present*
- https://sites.google.com/view/amsetrade/home?authuser=0

Education

MA Economics
Aix-Marseille School of Economics, Marseille, France   *2019 - 2021*

M.A., International Political Economy
King's College London, London, UK   *2017 - 2019*

B.A., Economics and Business
Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milan, Italy   *2014 - 2017*

Exchange Program, Economics and Business
University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia   *2014 - 2017*

Awards, Fellowships, & Grants

2020 - 2021   **Academic fellowship**, Aix-Marseille University, France   *€ 7,500*

Research Experience

Rsearch Assistant
Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France, Marseille (T. Demont and R. Ziparo)   *01/2019 - 06/2019*

Seminars and conferences

2024 (Scheduled). Bocconi Trade Tea seminars (Milan, Italy), Bocconi Politics and Institutions seminar (Milan, Italy)

2023. RIEF network (Brussels, Belgium), LAGV (Marseille France), AMSE PhD seminar

2022. ADRES (PSE, Paris, France), LAGV (Marseille, France), Asset (Crete, Greece), AMSE PhD seminar

Teaching Experience

Teaching Assistant, Aix-Marseille University

Micro III: General Equilibrium Theory *2021 - 2024*
- Undergraduate, 2nd year

Teaching Assistant, Aix-Marseille University

Data analysis with Excel *2024*
- Undergraduate, 1st year

Skills

Computer: STATA, MATLAB, QGIS, preliminary knowledge of R-studio, MS Office
Languages: Italian (Native), English (fluent), French (Fluent)

Work in Progress

The Backlash against Trade Globalization as a Revolt: The Role of Political Institutions While a number of economic factors have been associated to the rise of populism and the recent opposition to globalization, few theories have been proposed to explain the mechanisms through which trade globalization triggers its own backlash. Differently from the literature, in my first chapter I build and empirically test a new model centered on the role of political institutions. I study how, across countries, the protectionist party's vote share responds to increased trade openness with varying quality of political institutions. Two main characteristics measures quality of institutions: ensuring equal access to power for different groups and delivering fair redistribution. The model integrates the Heckscher-Ohlin framework with a variation of the Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) model of redistribution. The main mechanism of the model is that the absence of income redistribution policies, resulting from the winners of trade liberalization capturing political institutions, motivates trade losers to oppose traditional liberal parties in favor of protectionist parties. Conversely, in countries where political institutions remain uncaptured, trade losers can access the gains from trade, diminishing their support for protectionist parties. I empirically test this mechanism with a cross country difference in difference strategy and the gradual diffusion of air technology as an instrumental variable for trade openness. I find that in countries experiencing an increase in trade between consecutive elections, the vote share of the protectionist party increases (decreases) when the quality index of political institutions is low (high).

Insuring Against Trade Shocks: Spatial Analysis of Domestic Market Access, with Priyam Verma We revisit the "China Shock" literature which estimated 1.7 to 3 million manufacturing job losses across US labor markets due to Chinese imports. We aim to test the hypothesis that labor markets which have better pre-shock domestic market access, experience a smaller loss. This is particularly because those regions with better market access are better connected (e.g., to larger markets), have better input-output linkages, and are more productive. Thus, they can insure by negative shocks in a sector expanding production in the industries where each specific US CZs had a comparative advantage by using cheaper inputs, and sell it to nearby labor markets. We first derive a new and granular Market Access (MA) measure of local labor markets that is based on Caliendo Dvorkin and Parro (2019) and then estimate it for 722 x 22 (15884) labor markets - corresponding to the commuting zones and broad sectors in the US. We use US infrastructure maps to estimate domestic transportation cost using an advanced algorithm introduced in Allen and Arkolakis (2014) - needed to calibrate the model. Armed with the MA estimates, we now plan to re-estimate the baseline regressions in Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013) that originally studied the effect of import exposure on the labor market outcomes but integrate the exposure variables with the market access estimates. We believe that this MA measure could be an important policy tool for infrastructure investments.

Foreign aid and democracy: chinese aid vs world bank aid, with Vera Z. Eichenauer and Matteo Sestito