

# Manuel Staab

manuelstaab@gmail.com | +44(0)750 0978288 | manuelstaab.com

## Current Position

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### Post-Doctoral Fellow, Aix-Marseille School of Economics

-Research interests: game theory, economics of networks

## Research and Education

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### PhD in Economics, London School of Economics, 9/2013 – 7/2018

-Thesis: *Essays on peer effects in social groups and information misperception*

-Specializations/interests: microeconomic theory, economics of networks, and behavioural economics

-Advisors: Balázs Szentes and Francesco Nava

-Awards: LSE Economics Departmental Award (2013-15, 2017-18)

### MRes Economics, London School of Economics, (2012-2013)

-with Distinction

### MSc Economics, London School of Economics, (2011-2012)

-with Distinction

### BSc Economics and Economic History, London School of Economics, (2008-2011)

-Lilian Knowles Prize

## Work Experience

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### Senior Consultant, Game Theory and Procurement Consulting, TWS Partners, (2018 – 2020)

-Advising clients on market design in negotiations and procurement using insights from game theory, mechanism design and behavioural economics; duties include the design and implementation of structured negotiations and complex auction formats like multiproduct, multiunit auctions; direct involvement in sourcing projects with lifetime values between 150 million EUR and 1,500 million EUR

### Graduate Teaching Assistant, London School of Economics, (2011-2013, 2016-2018)

-Teaching Assistant for *Microeconomic Principles* (EC202) and *Macroeconomic Principles* (EC210)

-Teaching Assistant for summer school course *Intermediate Microeconomics*

### LSE Fellow in Economics, London School of Economics, (2013 - 2016)

-Teaching Assistant for MSc level course *Advanced Microeconomics* (EC487);

Lecturers: Erik Eyster and Leonardo Felli

-Teaching Assistant for MRes level course *Microeconomics* (EC441);

Lecturers: Balázs Szentes and Michele Piccione

### Adjunct Instructor (Lecturer), Richmond, The American University, (2013 - 2017)

-Responsible for course design, content delivery and examination; courses taught (including the selection of topics, structuring of the syllabus as well as planning and delivery of lectures): Intermediate Microeconomics, Principles of Investment, Introduction to Microeconomics

### Visiting Associate, Boston Consulting Group, (2010)

## Conferences and Presentations

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**2019** Birkbeck, University of London

**2018** EEA Annual Congress

University of Fribourg

Game Theory and Management (GTM)

**2014-17** LSE Theory Work in Progress Seminar

### **JOB MARKET PAPER:**

#### **The Formation of Social Groups under Status Concern**

I study the interaction of two forces in the formation of social groups: the preference for high quality peers and the desire for status among one's peers. I present a characterization of fundamental properties of equilibrium group structures in a perfect information, simultaneous move game when group membership is priced uniformly and cannot directly depend on type. While equilibrium groups generally exhibit some form of assortative matching between individual type and peer quality, the presence of status concern reduces the potential degree of sorting and acts as a force for greater homogeneity across groups. I analyze the effect of status concern for the provision of groups under different market structures and particularly focus on the implications for segregation and social exclusion. I find that status concern reduces the potential for and benefit from segregation - both for a social planner and a monopolist - but the interaction of preference for rank and status can make the exclusion of some agents a second-best outcome.

### **WORKING PAPER:**

#### **The Benefits of Being Misinformed (joint with Marcus Roel)**

We show how two fundamental mistakes in information processing affect the welfare ranking of information experiments. In the spirit of Blackwell ('51), we analyse the binary ranking of informative action profiles under different classes of perception distortions. By themselves, an agent's tendency to misinterpret signals and the degree to which the prior deviates from the truth reduce expected utility in a model where payoff relevant actions also generate informative signals. However, experiments can be affected to different degrees. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for when any binary ranking of action profiles can be reversed. Consequently, different types of mistakes can interact in non-obvious ways such that an agent might be better off suffering from both rather than just one. We provide a characterization when such positive interaction is possible.

#### **The Evolution of Status Preferences in Anti-Coordination Games**

This paper analyses how preferences over consumption rank and risk-taking behaviour can emerge as an evolutionary stable equilibrium when agents face an (anti-)coordination task. If information about relative consumption is available, this cannot be ignored, and evolutionary stable strategies are determined by consumption rank. This suggests status preferences to be salient in settings where miscoordination is particularly costly.