Anwesha Banerjee*, Alberto Prati**

Séminaires internes
phd seminar

Anwesha Banerjee*, Alberto Prati**

AMSE
Altruism in private provision of a public good*
Self-serving bias for temporal judgments: an empirical study using subjective well-being data**
Lieu

IBD Salle 21

Îlot Bernard du Bois - Salle 21

AMU - AMSE
5-9 boulevard Maurice Bourdet
13001 Marseille

Date(s)
Mardi 28 novembre 2017| 12:30 - 14:00
Contact(s)

Edward Levavasseur : edward.levavasseur[at]univ-amu.fr
Océane Piétri : oceane.pietri[at]univ-amu.fr
Morgan Raux : morgan.raux[at]univ-amu.fr

Résumé

*I present a model of a game of private provision of public goods with altruism towards other members of the society. Agents with exogenous, heterogeneous incomes have homogeneous utility functions which depend on their private consumption, the total amount of the public good available, as well as the utilities of all other agents in the society. Two alternate versions of the model are discussed. In the first version, agents only choose how much to contribute to the public good. The second version of the model allows agents to transfer money directly to other agents, as well as contribute to the public good. Preliminary results show conditions under which an equilibrium exists for the first model. If the public and the private good are complements, then an increase in altruism in the first version increases public good contribution in equilibrium. The equilibrium in the second model has a structure similar to Arrow’s (1981) charity game with transfers, with one critical difference.

**Among the many dimensions of happiness, satisfaction measures are certainly the most studied in economics. Although satisfaction is strongly path-dependent, the relationship between memory and current well-being is still unclear. This article is devoted to empirically investigate the relationship between present well-being and the capacity to date past economic events. We use a representative French national sample to look at how people recall their past wage changes. Our data support and extend some previous findings from the psychologic literature: events which are associated to positive emotions (wage raises) and which are relatively recent are recalled as closer in time, while events associated to negative emotions (wage cuts) and are relatively remote are recalled as further in time. Our analysis suggests that these effects – respectively known as “forward” and “backward telescoping” – are correlated with wage satisfaction, so that people who are more satisfied with their wage tend to date wage raises as more recent than less satisfied people (and wage cuts as more remote). This pattern in event dating is consistent with the existence of some retrospective self-serving believes. Finally, we analyze recall behaviors about another major economic event: price changes. Preliminary results from a quarterly panel of the French population support the hypothesis of retrospective self-serving believes in dating events.