Aurélien Baillon

Séminaires généraux
amse seminar

Aurélien Baillon

EM Lyon
Peer prediction markets to elicit unverifiable information
Co-écrit avec
Cem Peker, Sophie van der Zee

IBD Amphi

Îlot Bernard du Bois - Amphithéâtre

5-9 boulevard Maurice Bourdet
13001 Marseille

Lundi 12 juin 2023| 11:30 - 12:45

Ewen Gallic : ewen.gallic[at]
Avner Seror : avner.seror[at]


We introduce an incentive mechanism to elicit answers to binary questions that cannot be verified for accuracy. Agents choose whether to receive a costly private signal, which leads them to endorse ``yes'' or ``no'' as an answer. Then, they either buy or sell an asset, whose value is determined by the endorsement rate of ``yes'' answers. We obtain a separating equilibrium, where agents want signals and trade the asset as a function of their signal. Two experimental studies test the theoretical results. The first shows that the mechanism motivates costly information acquisition. The second demonstrates feasibility in a natural setting.