*What is the optimal maturity structure when public debt has a liquidity role in the economy? To answer this question, I develop a model of optimal fiscal policy in which government debt provides collateral services to the private sector. Without collateral constraint, the government is able to fully insulate its budget against fiscal shocks by borrowing long and investing short. This position allows for a decline in the value of public debt when fiscal conditions are bad. With collateral constraint, I find that issuing long-term debt is costly because it dries up private liquidity and reduces tax revenues when the government's budget is tight. The optimal maturity structure depends on the severity of the liquidity friction, but it no longer guarantees full insurance as it either hurts private liquidity or raises debt payments. For reasonable values of the friction's severity, I find that borrowing short-term and investing long-term is optimal.

**Can the disclosure of unpleasant truths contribute to the reconciliation and building of a new national identity? Truth commissions have become standard post-conflict structures to deal with past human rights violations and provide restorative justice. Yet, little is known about its effectiveness in reconciling and uniting highly fragmented societies. This paper examines the case of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Exploiting exogenous topographic variation in radio coverage combined with daily variation in the TRC hearings' live broadcasting. I find that the TRC coverage increased the salience of identity group issues. However, it also increased the perception of the TRC as key for reconciliation and nation-building, as well as trust in institutions. This is reflected in actual political conflict declining. Results seem consistent with the individuals struggling to face tough truths and unpleasant histories. Yet, facing these issues seems to allow real reconciliation.