Gilles Hacheme, Andrea Pérez Useche
Océane Piétri : oceane.pietri[at]univ-amu.fr
Morgan Raux : morgan.raux[at]univ-amu.fr
Laura Sénécal : laura.senecal[at]univ-amu.fr
Why employers post wages
How do employers set wages? There are two main wage-setting mechanisms: wage posting and wage bargaining. In this work, we study the determinants of those wage-setting modes using about 300.000 job ads extracted from the website of Pôle Emploi -the French employment agency. We discover spatial dependency in the way employers set wages: they are influence in their choice of posting or not wages by local factors of the labor market and by the behavior of nearest employers. So, using a model controlling for spatial dependence effects, that we name Nearest effect model, we find out that less precarious a job is, more likely the job ad would not display any wage information. More precisely, ads about full time and permanent jobs are more likely to not display wages. We also find that tighter is the local labor market, higher is the probability of choosing not posting any wage in a job ad. Moreover, jobs' seasonality also play an important role in that decision: more seasonal jobs are in the local labor market, more job ads without wages we get. All these conclusions can been related to the bargaining power literature. This work shows the importance of local and spatial factors on the choice of a wage-setting mode by employers.
Andrea Pérez Useche
Assessing assortativeness in household formation processes
The two last decades have witnessed significant progress in the understanding of how households form and take their decision collectively. An important aspect of the question is the extent to which households’ formations leads to assortative matching, views as to whether or not assortative matching is something that might be borne in mind to better understand how people interact and take their decisions within and across households. To the very best of my knowledge, the socioeconomic impact of the assortative mating is by no means clear at all (neither empirically nor theoretically). In this paper, I attempt to empirically investigate the assortativeness of household formation processes in the United States by using more robust methods of appraisal than the generally used in the literature. To do so, I propose an extension of the first order stochastic dominance test of Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982) to assess the statistical association of spouses by using their earnings as the economic attribute of differentiation.