Guillaume Bérard*, François Reynaud**

Séminaires internes
phd seminar

Guillaume Bérard*, François Reynaud**

AMSE
International comparisons of housing poverty and inequality*
Looking for regional accent discriminations in the labor market**
Co-écrit avec
Alain Trannoy*
Lieu

IBD Salle 16

Îlot Bernard du Bois - Salle 16

AMU - AMSE
5-9 boulevard Maurice Bourdet
13001 Marseille

Date(s)
Mardi 6 mars 2018| 12:30 - 14:00
Contact(s)

Edward Levavasseur : edward.levavasseur[at]univ-amu.fr
Océane Piétri : oceane.pietri[at]univ-amu.fr
Morgan Raux : morgan.raux[at]univ-amu.fr

Résumé

*Quite surprisingly, the study of housing inequality has not attracted a lot of researches, despite the fact that housing is a primary good à la Rawls. Indeed, bad housing conditions may weaken health, schooling and social network of the household members. Across the developed world, societies have reacted in quite different ways to this challenge of improving housing for poor people. Two main instruments have been used:  housing benefits and/or social housing. So, our research question is: By how much housing inequality is reduced with respect to a situation of laissez-faire? We want to answer this question by developing counterfactuals distribution of housing services if some housing public policies were not implemented (GE model), and testing our assumptions using panel data from EU-SILC and countries specific databases. More specifically, we will focus on France, US, UK, Germany and Netherlands. Expected results are: (1) housing inequality should be lower than consumption inequality which is itself lower than income inequality, (2) housing characteristics inequality should have decreased over time, and (3) housing inequality should be lower in the EU than in the US.

**This paper uses a correspondence study to test for regional accent discriminations on the French labor market. It consists to send three fictitious job applications to job offers in the Paris and the Marseille regions. Fictitious applicants differ by the accent-sounding of their answering machine message. Two fictitious applicants hold one Marseille accent, the Marseille upper-class accent or the Marseille ``traditional" working-class accents, and another one have the French ``standard" accent. I check whether employers leave a message by the accent they heard. The probability to get a message from employers neither differ by the applicant's accent. Simulating results with a higher sample size still do not show that Marseille accents are discriminated.