Mathilde Valero*, Ilia Gouaref**

phd seminar

Mathilde Valero*, Ilia Gouaref**

AMSE
Household income shocks and sibling composition: Evidence from rural Tanzania*
Welfare participation & private transfers**
Co-écrit avec
Edwin Fourrier-Nicolai**
Lieu

IBD Salle 16

Îlot Bernard du Bois - Salle 16

AMU - AMSE
5-9 boulevard Maurice Bourdet
13001 Marseille

Date(s)
Mardi 20 février 2018| 12:30 - 14:00
Contact(s)

Edward Levavasseur : edward.levavasseur[at]univ-amu.fr
Océane Piétri : oceane.pietri[at]univ-amu.fr
Morgan Raux : morgan.raux[at]univ-amu.fr

Résumé

*This paper examines the long-run effects of household income shocks on children's outcomes with different family structure. In particular, I exploit exogenous variation in rainfall across districts in Tanzania to investigate the extent to which transitory income shocks lead to different consequenceson education and marital status by gender and birth order. I find that extremely low and high rainfallrealizations have heterogenous effects on siblings within a family. Negative shocks may have posite long-lasting consequences on educational attainment for children with older siblings of the same sex. Moreover, contrary to previous findings, rainfall shocks reduce the probability of child marriage for girls with younger sisters, while the effect does not offset the higher probability of child marriage associated with younger brother. This study is consistent with a model in which parents respond to income shocks by allocating differently resources to boys and girls with different birth order.

**About half of individuals who are eligible to social assistance do not claim the benefit they are entitled to. We examine the role of informal transfers on welfare participation. Individuals are embedded within a fixed social network which may provide financial support to the network members they care about. Decision to participate depends on private transfers flowing from the network and on social stigma associated to participation. The social stigma is assumed to be a fixed cost common to all individuals while informal transfers depend on both the wealth of the receiver and of the network. Using the German SOEP data, we estimate the structural model and the effect of private transfers on welfare participation.  Receiving Private transfers reduce participation to social assistance.