Nastasia Henry*, Mariya Sakharova**
Camille Hainnaux : camille.hainnaux[at]univ-amu.fr
Daniela Horta Saenz : daniela.horta-saenz[at]univ-amu.fr
Jade Ponsard : jade.ponsard[at]univ-amu.fr
Nathan Vieira : nathan.vieira[at]univ-amu.fr
*To what extent protectionism (de)stabilize the economies? Since 2018, some countries have resorted to protectionist measures as the United States did. Although the impacts of protectionism on growth have been widely explored, without reaching a consensus, few has been said on its impacts on macroeconomic stability. This present paper attempts to gauge the (de)stabilizing role of protectionism using a Barro-type (1990) endogenous growth model with public debt and imperfect substitute assets where tariffs are a proxy of protectionism (Furceri et al., 2016). We first show that protectionism may have strong destabilizing effect on the economy. According to the tariffs, multiplicity of BGPs can occur, making room for global indeterminacy and this whatever the public debt level. The results contrast with the existing literature, suggesting that low debt-output ratio does not necessarily promote stability. Tariffs and public debt may prevent a coordination of expectations. Regarding public policies, imposing higher tariffs may enhance growth only when the government runs a primary surplus.
**How do late-industrializers transition from non-industrial economies to the early stages of industrialization? Given the differences in society and institutions between late-industrializers and industrialized regions it is not clear how the transition takes place. There is also a political economy aspect: it is uncertain how industrialization begins when there is an entrenched elite class invested in a traditional sector and not willing to invest in a new sector. However, what if an economic shock redistributes resources from the elite to the masses? Specifically, what is the effect of the redistribution of economic power from an elite class to the masses on regional industrial development: Is firm formation higher in affected regions? How do firm characteristics differ from those in adjacent regions? And who is responsible for founding firms in affected regions, is it the disenfranchised elite or the masses? My study takes advantage of a natural experiment related to the reallocation of land due to the serf emancipation in the Tsarist Russian Empire. In 1863 the Polish nobility revolted against the Tsar in the Western part of the empire. The revolt failed, and in retaliation the Tsarist government revised the terms of the emancipation by taking more land from the Polish nobility and reallocating the land towards the peasantry in the affected regions. Through spatial analysis and using detailed data on corporate charters and manufacturing censuses, I document a divergence in firm formation, firm characteristics and founder characteristics between the regions where there was greater reallocation from the gentry to the peasantry.