Nicolas Dumas

finance seminar

Nicolas Dumas

Université Paris 2
The trade-off between selling shares and giving bonuses to stimulate employee suggestions: A theoretical model based on contract theory
Lieu

Château Lafarge

Château Lafarge - Salle de séminaires
Château Lafarge
Route des Milles
13290 Les Milles
Date(s)
Mardi 8 novembre 2016| 14:30
Contact(s)

Eric Girardin : eric.girardin[at]univ-amu.fr
Christelle Lecourt : christelle.lecourt[at]univ-amu.fr

Résumé

Paying for suggestions is often not feasible because the employees can seldom prove that they initiated the idea. However, when the suggestion yields better performance, the employer can provide incentives by paying for performance or by selling shares to the employees. We consider a simple principal-agent model (both risk neutral) where exogenous variables affect the performance as well. We show that selling shares is more efficient than performance pay as long as the employer is not limited in number of shares he can offer to purchase. The model lays the foundation of a theory that predicts differences in the efficiency of profit sharing and stock ownership.