Paul Pezanis-Christou

Séminaires généraux
amse seminar

Paul Pezanis-Christou

University of Adelaide
A naive approach to bidding
Co-écrit avec
Hang Wu
Lieu

IBD Amphi

Îlot Bernard du Bois - Amphithéâtre

AMU - AMSE
5-9 boulevard Maurice Bourdet
13001 Marseille

Date(s)
Lundi 25 septembre 2017| 14:30 - 16:00
Contact(s)

Timothée Demont : timothee.demont[at]univ-amu.fr
Roberta Ziparo : rziparo[at]gmail.com

Résumé

We propose a novel approach to the modelling of bidding behavior in pay-your-bid auctions that builds on the presumption that bidders are mostly concerned with losing an auction if they happen to have the highest signal. Our models assume risk neutrality, no profit maximization and no belief about competitors’ behavior. They may entail overbidding or Symmetric Bayes-Nash Equilibrium bidding and we discuss conditions for the revenue equivalence of standard pay-your-bid auctions to hold. We fit the models to the data of first-price auction experiments and find that they do at least as well as the Bayes-Nash equilibrium benchmark model in organizing the observed behavior. Assuming probability misperception or impulse weighting (when relevant) improves their goodness-of-fit and leads to very similar revenue predictions. An analysis of individuals’ heterogeneous behavioral traits suggests that impulse weighting is a more consistent rationale for the observed behavior than a power form of probability misperception.