*We study farsighted behavior against myopic opponents in the local public goods game. We show the existence and payoff-uniqueness of optimal strategies in every network structure. We characterize the outcomes of the game and show that the game reaches an absorbing state almost surely for every network. We identify networks that allow or do not allow the farsighted player to exploit his myopic opponents.

**Policy makers mainly rely on physicians’ payment schemes to improve the quality of healthcare and reduce costs. There is an extensive theoretical and empirical literature on physicians’ payments. From 2011 on, there has been some experimental studies on physicians’ payment schemes, generally assessed on a cost-effectiveness criterion. However, whether incentives will push physicians to adapt their behaviors to the heterogeneity of patients’ case is still an opened question. Using an experimental study with 95 medical students in France, I study physicians’ payment systems when physicians are confronted to both easy and complex patients. I compare incentive properties of fee-for-service, capitation and pay-for-performance. I find that, pay-for-performance and capitation lead to comparable results in terms of quality. FFS is associated with the lowest level of quality for easy patients and to a level of quality comparable to P4P and CAP payment systems for more complex patients.