Raghul Venkatesh

ecolunch

Raghul Venkatesh

AMSE
Communication and verification in static games
Co-écrit avec
Sebastian Bervoets, Mathieu Faure
Lieu

IBD Salle 16

Îlot Bernard du Bois - Salle 16

AMU - AMSE
5-9 boulevard Maurice Bourdet
13001 Marseille

Date(s)
Jeudi 7 mars 2019| 12:30 - 13:45
Contact(s)

Mathieu Faure : mathieu.faure[at]univ-amu.fr
Gaëtan Fournier : gaetan.fournier[at]univ-amu.fr

Résumé

In a classic cheap talk game, the holder of private information communicates this information via a costless and unverifiable message. We relax the latter criterion by introducing a verification technology to the uninformed player. While communication remains costless, verficiation is costly. We characterize novel verification equilibria that are fundamentally different from the partitional equilibria of canonical cheap talk. We look specifically at two types of games: i) Crawford-Sobel setup with quadratic utilities; and ii) Cournot Duopoly with one-sided private information. We discuss possible applications to networks, accounting, labour market signaling, and coordination games.