Remzi Sanver

Séminaires généraux
amse seminar

Remzi Sanver

Université Paris Dauphine
Evaluationwise strategy-proofness
Co-écrit avec
Bora Erdamar, Shin Sato

VC Cinéma le Miroir

Centre de la Vieille-Charité - Cinéma le Miroir

Centre de la Vieille Charité
2 rue de la Charité
13002 Marseille

Lundi 26 septembre 2016| 14:30 - 16:00

Timothée Demont : timothee.demont[at]
Roberta Ziparo : rziparo[at]


We consider manipulation of collective decision making rules in a framework where voters not only rank candidates but also evaluate them as “acceptable ”or “unacceptable ”. In this richer informational setting, we adopt a new notion of strategy-proofness, called evaluationwise strategy-proofness, where incentives of manipulation exist if and only if a voter can replace an outcome which he finds unacceptable with an acceptable one. Evaluationwise strategy-proofness is weaker than strategy-proofness. However, we establish the prevalence of a logical incompatibility between evaluationwise strategy-proofness, anonymity and efficiency. On the other hand, we show possibility results when either anonymity or efficiency is weakened.

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