Romain Ferrali

big data and econometrics seminar

Romain Ferrali

AMSE
How to reduce bureaucratic corruption? Unpacking Brazilian anti-corruption audits
Co-écrit avec
Galileu Kim, Julieta Peveri
Lieu

IBD Salle 21

Îlot Bernard du Bois - Salle 21

AMU - AMSE
5-9 boulevard Maurice Bourdet
13001 Marseille

Date(s)
Mardi 21 juin 2022| 14:00 - 15:30
Contact(s)

Michel Lubrano : michel.lubrano[at]univ-amu.fr
Pierre Michel : pierre.michel[at]univ-amu.fr

Résumé

Under which conditions do anti-corruption policies effectively reduce bureaucratic corruption? Previous studies find that anti-corruption audits are effective in disciplining politicians, but their impact on bureaucrats is unclear. We leverage 10 years of randomized audits and the careers of 275 thousand Brazilian municipal officials. We find that audits lead to increased risks of dismissals and slower career progression. We further show that dismissals tend to target more non-tenured, less educated bureaucrats, suggesting that the program does not necessarily punish the most corrupt bureaucrats, but instead the ones that are easiest to punish.