Stéphane Benveniste*, Guillaume Bérard**
IBD Salle 16
AMU - AMSE
5-9 boulevard Maurice Bourdet
13001 Marseille
Edward Levavasseur : edward.levavasseur[at}univ-amu.fr
Océane Piétri : oceane.pietri[at]univ-amu.fr
Morgan Raux : morgan.raux[at]univ-amu.fr
*This paper studies multigenerational social mobility in the French Grandes Écoles (higher education elite schools) using surnames to track lineages. We construct for the first time a nominative dataset of graduate students from 10 elite schools over the period 1860-2015. With log-binomial generalized linear models, we estimate the relative representation of several groups of surnames in these elite schools across generations. Essentially, we compare the frequency of surnames in the schools to their frequency in the French population. Throughout the last one and a half century, noble families, Parisians, as well as descendants of Grandes Écoles’ graduates or political representatives all experienced a significantly better access to the Grandes Écoles. Rather than low social mobility overall, we provide evidence that the French elite succeeds at securing the education outcomes of its offspring.
**We estimates the effects of an increase in the real estate transfer taxes (RETT) rate from 3.80% to 4.50%, following an optional reform implemented in March 2014 by French départements. Not all the départements implemented the RETT increase, which is the starting point for a natural experiment: using a difference-in-differences design, we estimate two main effects. (1) An anticipation effect a month before the implementation of the reform in order to avoid the RETT increase (timing response). The total tax base increased by 28% just the month before. (2) The classic depressing effect of a tax on the equilibrium quantity (extensive margin response) is estimated to be 7% on average from March 2014 to October 2015. All in all, the average net effect corresponds to a drop of the transactions of 4.6% over a period of ten months following the implementation date. Furthermore, we estimate that the elasticity of the tax revenue to the tax increase is about 0.65, meaning that départements’ tax revenues are still on the increasing side of the Laffer curve.