Tizié Bene

phd seminar

Tizié Bene

AMSE
Formal insurance and altruism networks
Co-écrit avec
Yann Bramoullé, Frédéric Deroïan
Date(s)
Mardi 26 mai 2020| 11:00 - 11:45
Contact(s)

Anushka Chawla : anushka.chawla[at]univ-amu.fr
Laura Sénécal : laura.senecal[at]univ-amu.fr
Carolina Ulloa Suarez : carolina.ulloa-suarez[at]univ-amu.fr

Résumé

We analyze the impact of networks of altruism on the demand for formal insurance. To address this issue, we introduce stochastic incomes and a formal insurance into the model of altruism in networks of Bourlès, Bramoullé and Perez-Richet (2017). Incomes are subject to both an aggregate risk and idiosyncratic risks and agents can buy a formal insurance to cover the aggregate risk. The study mainly shows that altruism induces a substitution effect in agents' incentives to uptake the insurance. Second, the nature of the interplay between altruism and the demand for insurance is price-dependent: For low price levels, the altruism network reduces incentives to take out the insurance with respect to the case of a sel sh society, while altruism fosters incentives for high enough prices. Last, incentives are aligned with welfare.

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